University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2011

Successor Liability
John H. Matheson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matheson, John H., "Successor Liability" (2011). Minnesota Law Review. 391.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/391

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Successor Liability
John H. Matheson†
INTRODUCTION
The phrase mergers and acquisitions, or M&A for short,
signifies both the business activity of growing (or divesting)
corporate operations and the legal rules surrounding that activity. One typical acquisition technique is the purchase of business assets by one company from another. Indeed, General Motors and Chrysler utilized this transactional structure in their
bankruptcy reorganization following the recent global financial
crisis, with the United States Government as a part owner of
the purchasing entities.1 Asset sales transactions have various
benefits, one of which is that the purchaser presumptively does
not assume any of the seller‘s liabilities as part of the purchase
transaction. With respect to this ability to purchase assets
without also assuming liabilities, the Supreme Court declared
over 120 years ago that ―[t]his doctrine is so familiar that it is
surprising that any other can be supposed to exist.‖2

† Law Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Corporate
Law Institute, University of Minnesota Law School. Of Counsel, Kaplan
Strangis and Kaplan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. Copyright © 2011 by John
H. Matheson.
1. For contrasting views on the propriety of the use of a bankruptcy sale
of assets in this context, compare Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb,
Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (stating that the very core of bankruptcy law
is being destroyed), with Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 532 (2009) (illustrating how the
cases and their structure ―are entirely within the mainstream of chapter 11
practice‖).
2. Fogg v. Blair, 133 U.S. 534, 538 (1890); see 15 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 7122 ( perm. ed., rev. vol. 2008) [hereinafter FLETCHER ET AL.] (―The general
rule, which is well settled, is that where one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not liable for the debts and
liabilities of the transferor.‖).
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Let‘s take a simple example on a personal level. Assume
that you have a substantial physical asset, a car worth roughly
$10,000. You also have a thirty-six month unsecured installment loan obligation to a bank that you incurred to purchase
the car. The loan has a $9000 balance. I want to buy your car
and I pay you $9500 for it. I now own a car and I am $9500
poorer, and you have $9500 in cash to pay off a $9000 loan.
This appears to be a good deal for both of us.
However, what if you fail to pay back the bank? Additionally, what if the week before you sold me the car, you hit and injured a pedestrian while driving the car? After I buy your car,
the pedestrian sues for one million dollars in damages. Could
the bank collect from me for the $9000 loan obligation? Could
the injured pedestrian hold me liable for one million dollars? Of
course not.3
The answers to those questions may be quite different today when one company acquires the business assets of another
company. In terms of our hypothetical car purchase, the acquiring company may be saddled with the bank loan, the pedestrian claim, or both, irrespective of the fact that the purchaser
and seller explicitly agree, that the purchaser was only buying
an asset (the car) and not assuming any liabilities. I say that
the answer may be different because of the uncertain state of
the law of successor liability, which would be called upon to impose liability on the purchasing company in this context. Even
more extraordinarily, the potential liability of the purchaser is
not limited by the value of what it obtained from the selling
company, or even the overall value of the seller‘s total business.
Rather, the purchaser‘s total business is at risk. To use our car
purchase hypothetical, even if your assets available to satisfy
the bank and pedestrian claims were only $20,000, under modern successor liability law as applied to businesses, if I have assets of $500,000, then all of my assets (and indeed my financial
viability) are at risk to satisfy the claims found to be related to
my acquisition of your car.
Successor liability law is mostly composed of state common
law case-by-case decisions. These decisions fundamentally seek
to balance two competing, and often conflicting, policy goals: to
3. If I knew that I would be liable for your loan, I certainly would not pay
you $9500 for your car. More likely, I would offer you around $500. If I knew I
might be subject to potentially catastrophic tort liability because of the purchase, such as liability for the injured pedestrian claim, I likely would not buy
the car at all.
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provide a necessary remedy to injured parties, often tort claimants, and to provide transactional clarity and certainty for
business parties engaged in fundamental corporate transactions.4 As it has developed to date, however, successor liability
law is so varied and unpredictable that it is not only a trap for
the unwary,5 but a trap for the very wary, as well. Transactional asset-acquisition planning today faces the worst of all possible worlds: uncertainty as to whether successor liability applies, together with an enormous range of potentially applicable
monetary liabilities that may be brought on an assetpurchasing entity after the transaction is completed. Potentially deserving claimants are forced to litigate to see if they can
convince a court to apply some variation of successor liability
theory.6 Courts effectively are asked to, and sometimes do, rewrite the business deal after the fact and impose a liability allocation regime that the transacting parties would never have negotiated in the first place. More than a century of common law
experimentation has resulted in the ―doctrinal morass and high
degree of uncertainty that now surround successor liability.‖7
This Article proposes a simple and efficient statutory solution to the problem of successor liability, providing a remedy to
injured claimants while identifying for the business parties certainty as to apportionment of potential liabilities. Part I explains the basic acquisition strategies in the M&A arena, highlighting the fundamental legal differences that may support
use of one over the other. Part II explores the development of
successor liability, from nonliability through the explosion of
liability brought on by the development of products liability
and strict-liability doctrines, to the current doctrinal disarray.
4. ―Little effort is made to satisfy two policy goals: compensating plaintiffs as if the damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the
rule of successor liability from otherwise reducing the free transferability of
firms or their assets.‖ Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559,
1561–62 (1984).
5. Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ohio
1987) (―The adoption of the product line theory [of successor liability] . . . cast[s] a potentially devastating burden on business transfers and
would convert sales of corporate assets into traps for the unwary.‖).
6. The current ―liberal successor liability law‖ system ―virtually mandates that the plaintiff use substantial resources to identify the appropriate
defendant.‖ Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 45
(1986).
7. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1885 n.15 (1991).
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This Part also explains that the current haphazard application
of variant threads of successor liability doctrine leaves business
parties with no ability to predict, prepare, or effectively negotiate an asset acquisition transaction. Proposed policy rationales for expansive successor liability and potential remedies
for the existing situation are considered in Part III. This Part
explains why these proposals do not meet the important competing goals of maximum relief for deserving claimants and
transactional certainty for business parties in asset acquisition
transactions. Part IV presents an effective solution to be implemented as a federal statute, which calls for an automatic
transfer of liabilities from the divesting company to the acquiring company in the event of a transfer of substantially all assets, but provides for no unassumed transfer of liabilities otherwise. The time is ripe to provide clarity and uniformity to
guide the actions of parties to potential business transactions
as well as those who would seek to pursue remedial claims
against them.
I. MERGER AND ACQUISITION STRUCTURES
M&A transactions are among the most complex in the
business and legal world, often calling into play issues of corporate law, securities law, taxation, antitrust law, labor and employment law, and environmental law, just to mention a few.
Nevertheless, the basic structure of these transactions is not so
varied. Typically, an acquiring company will seek to acquire a
target company by one of three transaction structures: a purchase of stock, a merger, or a purchase of assets.8
Using a stock-acquisition structure, the acquiring company
purchases all, or at least a controlling interest in, the target
company‘s voting stock directly from the target‘s shareholders.
If the target company is privately held with only a few shareholders, the transaction may be a straightforward stockacquisition agreement in one or a series of transactions.9 If the
8. What follows is a highly simplified discussion of these alternative
transaction structures, but it is all that is necessary for the present purposes.
A more fulsome discussion can be obtained by consulting 1 LOU R. KLING &
EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES
AND DIVISIONS § 1.02 (2011). The classic discussion of these issues is found in
JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 75–138 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Tess Stynes, Live Nation Buys Artist Agency, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044222045761
30050245362060.html; Susan Wojcicki, We’ve Officially Acquired AdMob!,
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stock of the target company is publicly traded, the acquisition
is usually made by means of a tender offer, that is, a publicly
announced offer to buy the stock of the various public shareholders.10 With either a private or public company target, the
acquisition currency can be cash or acquiring company stock (or
some of each) and the acquisition can take place quickly.11 No
vote of the board of directors or the shareholders of the target is
required. The stock acquisition structure and its result look like
Figure 1.

Figure 1: Stock Acquisition Transaction
OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG ( May 27, 2010, 1:04 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot
.com/2010/05/weve-officially-acquired-admob.html.
10. Catherine Yeager Livingston et al., Acquisitions Utilizing Tender Offers in Today’s Market, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. (Aug. 10, 2010), http://
www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub_id=4590&site_
id=494&detail=yes (―The popularity of tender offers increased after the Securities and Exchange Commission‘s amendments to the ‗all holders/best price
rule‘ in 2007, and the increased use of tender offers continues through 2010.‖).
11. ―A tender offer can be completed in as few as 20 business days from
the launch of the tender offer. This is three to four times faster than a traditional merger could be completed . . . .‖ Id. Although a tender offer can result
from a negotiated acquisition, it is also the usual vehicle of choice in a hostile
acquisition since the acquirer can go above management‘s head and directly to
the shareholders to get control. See John H. Matheson & Jon R. Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 409–15 (1986).
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Assuming all of the stock of the target is acquired, the target becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring company. This means that the acquiring company effectively acquires
all of the assets and all of the liabilities of the target.12 These
assets and liabilities, however, are partitioned in the subsidiary. If the target‘s liabilities ultimately exceed its assets and
income-producing capacity, the subsidiary goes bankrupt and
the acquisition becomes worthless. The bad news in a stock acquisition is that the investment may ultimately be worth nothing; the good news is that, absent a piercing of the subsidiary‘s
corporate veil,13 the other assets of the parent are not at risk
and the viability of the parent is not threatened.
12. See, e.g., SCI Minn. Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral
Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 864 ( Minn. 2011) (―In the context of a stock sale
agreement, the law presumes that all assets and liabilities transfer with the
stock.‖).
13. For a discussion and empirical analysis of piercing in the parentsubsidiary context, see John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate
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One significant disadvantage of the stock-acquisition
transaction is its voluntary nature. Since the sale of stock is a
voluntary transaction, no shareholder is forced to sell its
shares. The acquiring company might not secure sufficient
shares to gain control and might be left with a situation where
there are minority shareholders.14 This could inhibit the freedom of the acquiring company to manipulate the operations
and assets of the target for its purposes, since the minority
shareholders may feel that they are being ignored or that the
acquiring company is engaged in self-dealing transactions.
These tensions and potential claims may make the stock acquisition method less than ideal in some circumstances.15
A second acquisition structure is the merger. A merger occurs when two business entities combine to produce a single
entity (the ―surviving‖ entity) pursuant to a merger plan.16 Unlike a stock acquisition, a merger is a corporate transaction;
that is, it typically requires the approval of both the target and
the acquirer‘s board of directors and an affirmative vote of the
shareholders of each entity.17 If one business decides to acquire
Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the ParentSubsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2009).
14. A related drawback may occur when the target is a publicly held corporation. If the potential acquirer announces a tender offer for the target‘s
shares, other potential acquirers are signaled that a valuable potential acquisition opportunity has been identified. This may spur a bidding war where the
original interested acquirer loses out.
15. For a discussion of the difficulties courts have had in reviewing actions of majority shareholders as part of corporate control, see John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in
the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 660 (2007), reprinted in 49
CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 421 (2007). These problems can be minimized if a
majority of the target‘s stock is acquired and the acquiring company engages
in a second-step squeeze-out merger of the minority shareholders.
16. Mergers can be direct or indirect, depending upon the presence of a
subsidiary. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(g) (1983). When a corporation is merged directly into the acquiring corporation, only the acquiring corporation survives the merger. Id. With ―triangular‖ mergers, a corporation
merges with a newly formed subsidiary of the acquiring corporation, and the
surviving corporation becomes a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. Id. A
transaction constitutes a ―merger‖ regardless of whether the corporation surviving the merger is a previously existing operating corporation or is a new
corporation formed solely for the purpose of accomplishing the merger. Id.
17. While this is true in almost all circumstances for the target corporation, the acquirer can often avoid a shareholder vote by creating a shell subsidiary to merge with the target company in what is often referred to as a triangular merger. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 8, at 78–79 (―In recent years,
transactions involving the use of S, a wholly-owned subsidiary of P[arent],
have become officially sanctioned under both corporate and tax law and have
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another company through direct absorption, a two-party merger takes place. The acquiring entity gives the existing owners
of the target company cash, stock, or other property in order to
acquire the target company. The merger transaction looks like
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Merger Transaction

When a merger becomes effective, a number of significant
changes occur simultaneously. Primarily, only one of the two
companies, the surviving entity, continues in existence, combining the separate existences of the constituent organizations—
the two businesses legally become one.18 As a result, the survivproven extremely popular. For example, if P prefers that T not be merged directly into P ( perhaps there are liabilities that P chooses not to assume directly), P can create S as its wholly-owned subsidiary and then cause T to be
merged into S.‖).
18. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 259 (―(a) When any merger or consolidation shall
have become effective under this chapter, for all purposes of the laws of this
State the separate existence of all the constituent corporations, or of all such
constituent corporations except the one into which the other or others of such
constituent corporations have been merged, as the case may be, shall cease
and the constituent corporations shall become a new corporation, or be merged
into 1 of such corporations, as the case may be, possessing all the rights, privileges, powers and franchises as well of a public as of a private nature, and being subject to all the restrictions, disabilities and duties of each of such corporations so merged or consolidated; and all and singular, the rights, privileges,
powers and franchises of each of said corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due to any of said constituent corporations on
whatever account, as well for stock subscriptions as all other things in action
or belonging to each of such corporations shall be vested in the corporation
surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation; and all property,
rights, privileges, powers and franchises, and all and every other interest shall
be thereafter as effectually the property of the surviving or resulting corporation as they were of the several and respective constituent corporations, and
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ing entity has all of the privileges, powers, property, rights, and
other interests of each of the constituent entities. More significantly for the current context, the surviving entity becomes legally responsible for all liabilities and obligations of each of the
constituent organizations, and all claims or proceedings against
a constituent company may be pursued against the surviving
entity.19 Therefore, quite literally, the assets and liabilities of
the constituent organizations become merged into, and the responsibility of, the surviving entity. To continue with our automobile and loan sales transaction analogy posited earlier, in
a merger, the surviving entity gets the car, the loan, and the injured pedestrian tort liability.
Given that a merger necessarily results in acquisition of all
of the liabilities as well as the assets of the target entity, businesses seeking to make acquisitions sometimes seek an alternative transactional structure that allows selectivity with respect to the liabilities assumed.20 This alternative structure is
the title to any real estate vested by deed or otherwise, under the laws of this
State, in any of such constituent corporations, shall not revert or be in any
way impaired by reason of this chapter; but all rights of creditors and all liens
upon any property of any of said constituent corporations shall be preserved
unimpaired, and all debts, liabilities and duties of the respective constituent
corporations shall thenceforth attach to said surviving or resulting corporation, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities and duties had been incurred or contracted by it.‖ (emphasis added));
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.07 (2011) (―(a) When a merger becomes effective:
(1) the corporation or eligible entity that is designated in the plan of merger as
the survivor continues or comes into existence, as the case may be; (2) the separate existence of every corporation or eligible entity that is merged into the
survivor ceases; (3) all property owned by, and every contract right possessed
by, each corporation or eligible entity that merges into the survivor is vested
in the survivor without reversion or impairment; (4) all liabilities of each corporation or eligible entity that is merged into the survivor are vested in the
survivor . . . .‖ (emphasis added)).
19. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 259 (―[A]ll debts, liabilities and duties of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said surviving or resulting corporation, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if
said debts, liabilities and duties had been incurred or contracted by it.‖);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.07 (―[A]ll liabilities of each corporation or eligible
entity that is merged into the survivor are vested in the survivor.‖).
20. There are certainly other reasons to prefer one form of acquisition
structure over another. For example, taxation consequences can form one of
the driving forces behind the chosen form of acquisition. An asset acquisition
may be tax favorable for the acquirer.
This transaction is most favorable to the buyer, who can record the
acquired assets at their FMV [fair market value] (which is usually an
increase from the seller‘s tax basis), thereby yielding more depreciation to use as a tax shield. This also results in a smaller gain if the
buyer subsequently sells the assets.
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the asset acquisition or transfer. In an asset acquisition, the
two constituent organizations exchange operational assets for
cash or other consideration, but do not merge and do not become a single entity. Each business starts as a separate entity,
and each business survives as a distinct entity with its own
separate existence after the asset acquisition. An asset transfer
between two businesses looks like Figure 3.
Figure 3: Asset Acquisition Transaction

Legally, the distinction between a merger and an asset
transfer is monumental.21 With the former, the acquiring entity
has no choice in selecting among the target‘s assets and liabilities. The acquirer succeeds to the amalgam of the two original
entities. With the latter, however, the acquiring entity can selectively choose which assets and which, if any, liabilities it
wants to acquire. In terms discussed earlier, the acquiring entiSTEVEN M. BRAGG, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 253 (2009).
Additional reasons for using the acquisition structure as compared to the
merger structure include that (1) the acquisition consideration flows to the divesting company for its use and not to its shareholders, and (2) an acquisition
of assets usually does not require approval of the acquiring company‘s shareholders, whereas a merger usually does.
21. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 401–61 (1986) (describing and discussing the respective differences in legal consequences between the ―polar cases‖ of merger and asset sales as ―two relatively clear cases
that have rather different characteristics and consequences‖).
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ty can take the car without acquiring any obligation for the
loan or the pedestrian‘s tort claim. Moreover, even if some liabilities are assumed as part of an asset-transfer transaction,
the specific obligations assumed can be specifically identified
and priced. That is, the consideration paid for the acquired assets (and possibly liabilities) will reflect the basket of items acquired. Therefore, at least from the liability minimization perspective, an asset acquisition is a much more favorable
transactional acquisition structure than a merger. Additionally,
there is clarity and seeming certainty as to what is being acquired, allowing for an informed determination of the price to
be paid.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
Basic notions of contract and tort law form the bedrock
foundation for traditional successor nonliability in asset acquisitions. No person should be bound by contractual obligations
that they have not voluntarily assumed.22 Similarly, no person
should be liable for torts they did not commit.23
The viability of this traditional rule of successor nonliability in the world of modern business transactions flows fundamentally from the need to secure the free alienability of corporate assets.24 This principle, in turn, encompasses two corollary
policies: (1) the successor to ownership of assets should be protected from unassumed liabilities of the predecessor,25 and (2)
the rule of successor nonliability promotes predictability in cor-

22. See George L. Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 683–84 (1983) (discussing how ―no
one should be bound by an agreement to which he is not a party‖ and ―a successor‘s nonliability is supported by the fact that he was not at fault‖).
23. See Roe, supra note 4, at 1560–61 (―The rationales for denying successor liability are straightforward: the successor is not at fault; liability will not
deter misbehavior; compensation must be from the wrongdoer and not from an
innocent third party . . . .‖).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. a
(1998) (―[T]he general rule of nonliability derives primarily from the law governing corporations, which favors the free alienability of corporate assets and
limits shareholders‘ exposures to liability in order to facilitate the formation
and investment of capital.‖); Lenard, supra note 22, at 684 (―A final argument
for the traditional rule is that successor nonliability promotes the free alienability and transferability of corporate assets.‖).
25. See David Morris Phillips, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and Commercial Law Perspective, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249,
258 (1982) (discussing the fairness of the creditor-protection argument in applying traditional successor liability).
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porate transactions.26 The relationship between these interdependent principles has been explained as follows:
Under the well-settled rule of corporate law, where one company sells
or transfers all of its assets to another, the second entity does not become liable for the debts and liabilities, including torts, of the transferor. . . .
The successor rule was designed for the corporate contractual
world where it functions well. It protects creditors and dissenting
shareholders, and facilitates determination of tax responsibilities,
while promoting free alienability of business assets.27

Nevertheless, the concept of preserving limited liability for
the purchasing entity can be subject to significant strain.28
Tensions are particularly acute when the selling entity distributes the proceeds of its sale of assets to its shareholders and

26. See Sharon L. Cloud, Note, Purchase of Assets and Successor Liability:
A Necessarily Arbitrary Limit, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 791, 793 (1986) (―Another
side of this issue is the need for predictability in the law of successor liability
for corporations planning business expansion. Facing potentially unlimited
and unpredictable exposure for future products liability claims which they had
no part in creating forces companies interested in acquisitions to reconsider.
Corporations for sale face a correspondingly shrinking market. In purely economic terms, the free flow of assets to their most efficient uses is severely impaired if there is no way to know at the outset how much an acquisition will
truly cost.‖ (citations omitted)); see also Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation’s Liability for Its Predecessor ’s Defective
Products When the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor’s Assets for Cash,
71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 821–22 (1988) (making reference to predictability in
corporate transactions in the context of a free alienability of corporate assets
discussion).
27. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77–78 (3d Cir. 1986); see also
Cloud, supra note 26, at 795 (―[Traditional successor liability‘s] purpose was to
‗promote predictability in corporate transactions, free availability of capital
and mobility in the business and economic world in general.‘‖ (citation omitted)).
28. Since January 1, 2010, more than 500 reported federal and state cases
have dealt with some element of successor liability. Westlaw search of ―ALLCASES‖ database using term: [―successor liability‖] on October 14, 2011. This
Article does not address those situations where federal or state legislation specifically mandates or negates successor liability. Compare environmentalcleanup liability under CERCLA for any owner or operator of property, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006), with sales in bankruptcy ―free and clear‖ of claims, 11
U.S.C. § 363(f ) (2006), and MINN. STAT. § 302A.661, subdiv. 4 (2010) (―The
transferee is liable for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the transferor
only to the extent provided in the contract or agreement between the transferee and the transferor or to the extent provided by this chapter or other statutes of this state . . . . The transferee shall not be liable solely because it is
deemed to be a continuation of the transferor.‖). Where no statute applies to
define the contours of successor liability doctrine, federal or state common law
applies. See, e.g., Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96–97
(3d Cir. 2011).
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then dissolves.29 Especially when claims against the dissolving
entity relate to latent product or drug defects that do not manifest themselves until much later, claimants may find that
there are no readily accessible assets to compensate for their
injuries.30 These claimants then appear as appealing plaintiffs
in search of an alternative pocket to pay damages.31
A. TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO SUCCESSOR NONLIABILITY
The concept that a purchase of assets is not a purchase of
liabilities, while well-recognized in corporate acquisition transactions,32 was never monolithic. Imposing liability on the purchaser of assets has long been subject to four traditional exceptions: (1) the transaction is a fraudulent effort to avoid
liabilities of the predecessor, (2) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes the obligations of the predecessor, (3) the
transaction is a de facto merger, or (4) the successor is a mere
continuation of the predecessor.33 Several of these exceptions,
however, even in their traditional form, have evolved to bring
tremendous uncertainty to an otherwise voluntary transactional allocation of liabilities between two businesses.34
29. See Cloud, supra note 26, at 803.
30. See id. at 793, 803.
31. See id. at 793.
32. See Fogg v. Blair, 133 U.S. 534, 541 (1890) (―That [trust fund] doctrine
only means that the property must first be appropriated to the payment of the
debts of the company before any portion of it can be distributed to the stockholders. It does not mean that the property is so affected by the indebtedness
of the company that it cannot be sold, transferred, or mortgaged to bona fide
purchasers for a valuable consideration, except subject to the liability of being
appropriated to pay that indebtedness. Such a doctrine has no existence.‖).
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (1998).
The discussion that follows in Parts II.A. and B. may be somewhat simplified
from a full-blown breakdown of theories and their permutations, as well as the
variations between and among the states as to adoption of those theories. The
analysis here is what is necessary for the purpose of this Article. For an expansive exploration of the minutiae of variations and adoptions, see generally
George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 FLA.
ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 9 (2007).
34. See Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 461–64 (3d
Cir. 2006) (noting differences between New Jersey and Pennsylvania successor
liability law, stating that ―[w]hile the basic tenet of successor liability law is
based in corporate law, the exceptions span a loose substantive continuum
from contract to corporate to tort law‖). An additional area of variation comes
when the federal courts decide successor-liability issues as a matter of federal
common law. See, e.g., Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 94
(3d Cir. 2011) (―Federal courts beginning with Golden State have developed a
federal common law successorship doctrine imposing liability upon successors
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1. Fraud or Fraudulent Conveyance
The first exception to successor nonliability is not unusual.
Fraud generally will taint the result of any transaction. In the
context of asset transfers, this exception applies where the
transaction is fraudulently entered into by a corporation to
evade liability for debts.35 Fraud determinations generally are
relatively straightforward and can be viewed as an application
or offshoot of the general rule prohibiting fraudulent transfers.
For example, a successor will be held liable where a showing is
made that the successor corporation was created for the sole
purpose of evading the predecessor‘s creditors,36 or where the
consideration for the transfer was inadequate or fictitious.37
2. Agreed Assumption of Liabilities
One of the attractive features of an asset sale is that the
purchasing corporation can presumptively pick and choose
what it wants to take. So the second traditional exception to
successor nonliability really is not an exception at all.38 That is,
beyond the confines of the common law rule when necessary to protect important employment-related policies.‖); Prince v. Kids Ark Learning Ctr., LLC,
622 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying a nine-factor test for successor liability
for sexual harassment under Title VII). See generally Wendy B. Davis, De Facto Merger, Federal Common Law, and Erie: Constitutional Issues in Successor
Liability, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 529 (discussing federal-state constitutional problems).
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. e
(―Fraudulent transfer in order to avoid debts or liabilities. Subsection (b) incorporates by reference the relevant state law governing fraudulent conveyances and transfers. In contexts other than successor products liability,
fraudulent transfers can be set aside on behalf of existing creditors of the
transferor. In this context, fraudulent transfers provide a basis for holding
successors liable to post-transfer tort plaintiffs. The fact that general creditors
are pursuing remedies against the transferee does not prevent tort plaintiffs
from pursuing remedies under Subsection (b). What constitutes a fraudulent
conveyance or transfer is determined by reference to applicable state law.‖).
36. Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715,
722 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), aff ’d, 959 P.2d 1052, 1060 (Wash. 1998); Schmoll v.
ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868, 875 (D. Or. 1988), aff ’d, 977 F.2d 499, 499
(9th Cir. 1992).
37. Eagle Pac. Ins. Co., 934 P.2d at 722.
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. d
(―Agreement for successor to assume liability. When the successor agrees to assume liabilities for defective products sold by its predecessor, liability is imposed . . . in accordance with the terms of the agreement. As a general matter,
contract law governs the application of this exception. Courts have interpreted
general statements that the successor agrees to assume the liabilities of the
predecessor to include products liability claims even though the agreement
makes no specific mention of products liability. However, assumption of prod-
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if the purchasing party contractually assumes liabilities from
the seller, then it has chosen to be liable and presumptively has
paid less for the assets acquired.
An express assumption of liability is fairly easy to spot in
the asset-acquisition contract.39 Typically, existing contracts of
a selling company are expressly assumed in the purchase documents so that the business can continue in an uninterrupted
manner.40 Existing liabilities of a selling company may or may
not be assumed, but unwanted or contingent liabilities are typically avoided through the use of clauses expressly accepting or
disclaiming any assumption.41
ucts liability is not implied by the successor‘s assumption of specific duties
with regard to product service or replacement.‖); see, e.g., Kessinger v. Grefco,
Inc., 875 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1989), reh’g denied, No. 88-3025, 1989 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11712 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding express assumption of liabilities).
As ideally applied, this exception ―requires an express or implied assumption
of liabilities, not an express exclusion of liabilities.‖ Columbia Propane, L.P. v.
Wis. Gas Co., 661 N.W.2d 776, 785 (Wis. 2003) (citing Fish v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Wis. 1985)). Drafters can take some comfort in the
fact that courts have said that ―[u]nless the words used by the parties to express their agreement are found to be ambiguous in some material respect, the
court should give them legal effect according to their plain, ordinary and popular meaning.‖ Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 575 (10th Cir. 1989); cf.
Grugan v. BBC Brown Boveri, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1080, 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(finding that the language of the contract was broad enough to include contingent tort liability of seller).
39. See, e.g., Feinberg v. RM Acquisition, LLC, 629 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir.
2011) (finding that contract did not provide for assumption of liabilities); Am.
Standard, Inc. v. OakFabco, Inc., 927 N.E.2d 1056, 1058–59 (N.Y. 2010) (finding a contractual assumption of tort liabilities). For a discussion of this contractual liability allocations process, see Robert T. Miller, The Economics of
Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business Combination
Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2035–50, 2070–91 (2009).
40. See David W. Pollak, Successor Liability in Asset Acquisitions, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY, 133, 141 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1742, 2009) (―The purchasing corporation will normally assume certain liabilities necessary to the uninterrupted
conduct of the business.‖).
41. Miller, supra note 39, at 2089–90 (―This leaves, as the kinds of risk
typically allocated by MAC Conditions to the party itself, all risks other than
those systematic, indicator, and agreement risks shifted under MAC Exceptions. The most obvious of these are the risks associated with the ordinary
business operations of the party—the kinds of negative events that, in the ordinary course of operating the business, can be expected to occur from time to
time, including those that, although known, are remote. In reported MAC litigations and in MAC disputes between merger partners that have become public, the events to which parties have in fact pointed when declaring MACs
have often been particularly severe adverse events of the kinds that can be expected to occur in the party‘s business—for example, loss of important customers or sales due to competitive pressures, cyclical down turns in the business,
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Whether a purchasing company assumes the liabilities or
debts of the seller in satisfaction of the assumption exception
depends on the particular language used in the purchase
agreement and other surrounding circumstances, such as the
purchaser‘s conduct.42 Express assumption of some liabilities
does not imply assumption of all liabilities; but, in determining
if there has been an implied assumption, a reviewing court will
draw upon general principles of contract interpretation and the
objective theory of the contract.43 Courts generally find purchasers to have impliedly assumed liabilities when ―the conduct
or representations relied upon . . . evidence an intention on the
part of the purchasing company to assume the old corporation‘s
liabilities in whole or in part.‖44 What constitutes a sufficient
manifestation varies by jurisdiction, but purchasers assuming
even one contract or obligation outside of those specified in the
asset purchase agreement may assume the risk of being found
to have impliedly assumed all of the predecessor‘s contingent
liabilities.45
More fundamentally, in addition to the uncertainties engendered by the courts‘ ability to interpret the terms of the asset acquisition contract, even an express and clear denial of liabilities may be to no avail when it comes to tort or product
liability claims as opposed to contract obligations.46 Courts may
large tort liabilities arising from the company’s operations, problems rolling
out new information and accounting systems, and product defects along with
resulting recalls and product liabilities claims.‖ (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted)).
42. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Pontiac Plastics & Supply Co., No. 214079, 2000
WL 33538535, at *3 ( Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2000).
43. See id. Application of the assumption of the liability exception based
on the explicit language of the agreement gives the purchaser a greater degree
of certainty than application based on extraneous circumstances. See Kuney,
supra note 33, at 23–24 (distinguishing between application of the express or
implied assumption of liability exception based on language of the contract
versus application focusing on conduct or representation).
44. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7124.
45. See, e.g., Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Hutter, 696 A.2d 157, 160–61 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (finding the fact that the purchaser did not expressly agree to
assume seller‘s obligations was immaterial where performance of expressly
assumed obligations leads to reasonable belief that all were assumed).
46. With respect to contract obligations, precise drafting may be effective.
For example, the fact that the defendant expressly denied liability not only of
claims resulting from breach of contract, but also for any claims specifically
―arising in connection‖ with plaintiff ‘s breach of contract made this exception
inapplicable in this Minnesota case. Source One Enters., LLC v. CDC Acquisition Corp., No. Civ. 02-4925(PAM/RLE), 2004 WL 1453529, at *3 (D. Minn.
June 24, 2004); see also Fernandez v. Spar Tek Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 0:06-
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simply conclude that, although the parties to the assetacquisition agreement have allocated liabilities between themselves, this allocation ―is not dispositive‖ as to third party tort
or product liability claims.47 If courts do not allow the parties to
allocate these risks so as to bind non-parties, then the concept
of successor nonliability is substantially weakened, creating
unfortunate transactional value uncertainty.48
3. De Facto Merger
In a standard statutory merger, as discussed previously,
the purchaser assumes all of the debts and liabilities of the seller by operation of law.49 The third exception courts have used
to impose successor liability in an asset acquisition is found in
cases where the court determines that the asset sale amounts
to a de facto merger of the buyer and seller.50 This exception extends liability to a successor when a reviewing court finds that
the sale has mimicked the end result of a merger except for the
assumption of liability.51 As traditionally applied, a transaction
3252-CMC, 2008 WL 2403647, at *4 (D.S.C. June 10, 2008) (determining that
the exception did not apply when the purchase agreement included an express
provision denying any assumption of the seller‘s contractual or other liability);
Glidden v. Thompson & Hawley Funeral Home, No. 259887, 261002, 2006 WL
2033979, at *4 ( Mich. Ct. App. July 20, 2006) (indicating that absent clear
evidence in the record to the contrary, language in the contract expressly denying liabilities controls).
47. Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(―The fact that Dorsey and its predecessor, Daro, had an agreement whereby
Dorsey was not to assume Daro‘s liabilities is not dispositive.‖); see also Cyr v.
B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152–54 (1st Cir. 1974) ( purchase agreement
exonerating purchaser not determinative of third party rights); Vernon Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 336 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (exculpatory
provision in contract ineffective to exonerate persons from liability to one not
party to agreement).
48. See Roe, supra note 4, at 1561 (―Concerns over successor liability may
already be affecting, and possibly stymieing, asset sales.‖).
49. See Michael Carter, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: It’s Time to
Fully Embrace State Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 767, 776–77 (2008) (explaining
that the aspect of limited liability of an asset sale makes the structure potentially more favorable than either a statutory merger or a purchase of a controlling interest in the target company‘s stock); supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
50. It appears that the first time that the United States Supreme Court
used this term and applied this concept was in a taxation case, Helvering v.
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. 306 U.S. 522, 529 (1939). The earliest explicit state court reference to the de facto-merger doctrine in a successor liability
context probably is Jennings Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co. 159 S.W. 1088, 1089
(Tenn. 1913).
51. See Carter, supra note 49, at 778–79.
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structured as an asset sale may be deemed by a court to be a de
facto merger, despite the lack of a formal statutory merger, if
all of the following factors are present:
(1) continuity of ownership; (2) cessation of ordinary business and dissolution of the acquired corporation as soon as possible; (3) assumption by the purchaser of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the business of the acquired corporation;
and (4) continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operation.52

As an initial matter, the de facto-merger concept contradicts the corporate doctrine of ―independent legal significance.‖53 This doctrine states that transactions accomplished
under one set of corporate statutory provisions, like those governing an asset purchase and sale, will not be tested under
other statutory provisions, such as those applicable to a merger.54 Each set of provisions and each way of structuring the
transaction has its own independent legal significance. Nevertheless, even Delaware, known as a bastion of pro-corporate
legislation and court decisions,55 accepts the traditional successor liability exceptions, including de facto merger.56
52. New York v. Nat‘l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2006);
see also Payne v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 190 P.3d 102, 107–08 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2008); FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7124.20.
53. See Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 892 n.47 (Del. 2002)
(―[T]he general theory of the Delaware Corporation Law that action taken
pursuant to the authority of the various sections of that law constitute acts of
independent legal significance and their validity is not dependent on other
sections of the Act.‖ (quoting Langfelder v. Universal Lab., Inc., 68 F. Supp.
209, 211 (D. Del. 1946), aff ’d, 163 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1947))).
54. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 847– 49
(1998) (accomplishing transaction by merger without a class vote of shareholders valid despite the requirement of a class vote if the transaction had been
accomplished by way of an amendment to the certificate of incorporation).
55. The Delaware courts have rejected the de facto-merger doctrine when
sought to be used not to impose liability but rather to provide shareholders
with dissent and appraisal rights. See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 182 A.2d
22, 27–28 (Del. Ch. 1962) (relying on the independent legal significance doctrine), aff ’d, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). See generally Philip S. Garon, Michael
A. Stanchfield & John H. Matheson, Challenging Delaware’s Desirability as a
Haven for Incorporation, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 771 (2006) (comparing ―Delaware corporate law and jurisprudence primarily to one jurisdiction,
Minnesota‖).
56. Ross v. DESA Holdings Corp., No. 05C-05-013 MMJ, 2008 WL
4899226, at *3– 4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008) (―The Delaware Court‘s defining of this issue is all together appropriate because the applicable law to
which the capable Delaware Court will apply the facts is Delaware law, not
federal law. Delaware courts recognize successor liability as a viable legal
theory and, as well, that there are exceptions to the general principle that
purchasers of assets do not succeed to a seller‘s liability. . . . In Delaware,
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More troubling is the fact that different jurisdictions have
created various tests for evaluating whether an asset sale
amounts to a de facto merger. Some states have strict elementbased tests that require an affirmative showing on each of a
number of factors,57 while others use a less-formal list of nondispositive factors and make determinations based on the totality of the circumstances.58 That is, although initially applicable
to a relatively narrow set of circumstances, several jurisdictions
have retooled their de facto-merger analysis to allow successor
liability to reach a broader range of transactions.
More fundamentally, some courts expanded the exception
by lessening the requirements for finding a de facto merger. In
Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., for example, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals disregarded the traditional de
facto-merger requirement that selling corporations dissolve after the asset sale.59 The court analyzed the transfer in terms of
the policies underlying strict product liability and noted that,
although the predecessor corporation continued to exist for over
when one company sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another company, the buyer generally is not responsible for the seller‘s liabilities, including claims arising out of the seller‘s tortious conduct. In limited situations,
where avoidance of liability would be unjust, exceptions may apply to enable
transfer of liability to the seller. Exceptions include: (1) the buyer‘s assumption of liability; (2) defacto merger or consolidation; (3) mere continuation of
the predecessor under a different name; or (4) fraud.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
57. See, e.g., Nat’l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d at 213 (stating all four factors
must be present to find de facto-merger successor liability); Perimeter Realty
v. GAPI, Inc., 533 S.E.2d 136, 145– 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Myers v. Putzmeister, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Howell v. AtlanticMeeco, Inc., No. 01CA0084, 2002 WL 857685, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 26,
2002). Vermont only requires evidence of three elements. See CAB-TEK, Inc.
v. E.B.M., Inc., 571 A.2d 671, 672 (Vt. 1990) (stating de facto merger occurs
where a corporation (1) takes control of all of the assets of another corporation,
(2) without consideration, and (3) the predecessor ceases to function).
58. Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815, 819 ( Mass.
1997) (noting that although continuity of ownership is not a threshold requirement, ―[i]n determining whether a de facto merger has occurred, courts
pay particular attention to the continuation of management, officers, directors
and shareholders‖); Harashe v. Flintkote Co., 848 S.W.2d 506, 509 ( Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) ( listing the four traditional elements but noting, ―[i]t is not necessary to find all the elements to find a de facto merger‖ (emphasis omitted));
Richmond Ready-Mix v. Atl. Concrete Forms, Inc., No. Civ.A. 92-0960, 2004
WL 877595, at *9–10 (R.I. Apr. 21, 2004).
59. Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 368–70 (3d Cir. 1974);
see also Brooks v. Specialty Minerals, Inc., No. 08-cv-30233-MAP, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13597, at *17 (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2011) (holding that the de factomerger ―doctrine has no applicability where, as here, the original manufacturer remains in existence to respond in tort for its alleged negligence‖).
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a year after the sale, the State had a strong policy interest in
resolving issues related to products liability with a flexible approach:
because of the complexities of modern corporate reorganizations, it is
no longer helpful to consider an individual transaction in the abstract
and solely by reference to the various elements therein determine
whether it is a ‗merger‘ or a ‗sale‘. Instead, to determine properly the
nature of a corporate transaction, we must refer not only to all the
provisions of the agreement, but also to the consequences of the
transaction and to the purposes of the provisions of the corporation
law said to be applicable.60

A similar rationale was applied by the Eastern District of
New York in Diaz v. South Bend Lathe Inc. when it held the
transaction in question amounted to a de facto merger even
though the parties had not exchanged any stock.61 Although the
sale was an all-cash transaction, the court nevertheless found
that evidence of the assumption of the predecessor‘s manufacturing contracts, the dissolution of the predecessor, and a continuity of management, personnel, and facilities amounted to a
de facto merger.62 The court held that by purchasing the predecessor‘s ―whole . . . asset package‖ the successor had ―simply incorporated—or merged—[the predecessor‘s] ongoing business
into that of its own . . . .‖63 The Knapp and Diaz decisions il60. Knapp, 506 F.2d at 368 (quoting Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d
25, 28 (Pa. 1958)); accord Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 887 N.E.2d
244 ( Mass. 2008).
61. Diaz v. S. Bend Lathe Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Contra Nat’l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d at 215 (requiring continuity of ownership under de facto-merger exception).
62. Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 101–03.
63. Id. at 102. Generally, the continuity of ownership factor will not be
satisfied when there is a cash for asset sale. In Payne v. Saberhagen Holdings,
Inc., the court did not impose liability under the de facto-merger doctrine because there was no continuity of ownership between the predecessor and successor corporations. 190 P.3d 102, 108 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). The court explained that the continuity of ownership element is present only when the
ownership before the merger and after the merger is the same. It explained
that when there is a ―mere asset purchase for cash,‖ there is no continuity of
ownership. Id. Under similar facts, an Illinois court also declined to impose
liability under the de facto-merger doctrine. Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson
Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1106–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). The court
explained that there was no continuity of ownership since the assets were purchased with cash rather than stock. Id. But, it is important to note that the
court looked to the ―four factors‖ as requirements that all must be met rather
than a balancing test. Id. This approach is different from other courts that use
the factors, but do not necessarily require all factors be present to find a de
facto merger. See generally MacCleery v. T.S.S. Retail Corp., 882 F. Supp. 13,
16 (D.N.H. 1994) (applying New Hampshire law); Korzetz v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136, 143 (E.D. Mich. 1979); FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2,
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lustrate how the once well-defined de facto-merger exception
can be wholly transformed by the mere addition or subtraction
of a single factor in the liability inquiry. It is through processes
similar to those applied in Knapp and Diaz that traditional exceptions have been transformed into amorphous standards that
are no longer confined to those cases in which the parties seek
to obfuscate liability.
4. Mere Continuation
Closely related to the traditional de facto-merger exception
is the mere-continuation exception.64 This fourth exception, like
the exception for de facto mergers, embodies a policy that corporations should not be able to avoid liability by simply changing their form or name.65 The mere-continuation exception focuses on what happens after the sale and ignores the type of
consideration used. This exception imposes liability when there
is merely a reorganization.66 Liability is imposed when the purchasing corporation ―is merely a ‗new hat‘ for the seller.‖67 The
§ 7124.20 n.5 (citing Atlas Tool Co. v. Comm‘r of Internal Revenue, 614 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1980)).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12, cmt. b
(1998) (―Subsections (c)[de facto merger] and (d)[mere continuation] deal with
successors that, in a real sense, did produce and distribute the product that
caused the harm, though in a somewhat different organizational form. Subsection (c) deals with the transferor corporation that merges by law or in fact into
the transferee, typically with no substantial change in corporate management
or ownership. Subsection (d) concerns the transfer of corporate assets in the
context of a transaction involving only a change in organizational form. In
both these situations, liability for harm caused by defective products distributed previously should be imposed on the business entity that emerges from
the transaction. In substance, if not in form, the post-transfer entity distributed the defective products and should be held responsible for them. If mere
changes in form were allowed to control substance, corporations intending to
continue operations could periodically wash themselves clean of potential liability at practically zero cost, in sham transactions, and thereby unreasonably
undermine incentives for producers and distributors to invest in product safety
and unfairly deny tort plaintiffs adequate remedies when defective products later cause harm.‖); see also Milliken, 887 N.E.2d at 254 n.15 (―The terms ‗de facto
merger‘ and ‗mere continuation‘ are often used by courts interchangeably.‖).
65. Murphy, supra note 26, at 821 (noting that the de facto-merger exception and the mere-continuation exception are arguably the same exception because the only difference is that the de facto-merger exception does not require
continuity of management).
66. See McCarthy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 ( Mass.
1991) (citing FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7122 n.15 and cases).
67. McCarthy, 570 N.E.2d at 1012 (quoting Bud Antle, Inc. v. E. Foods,
Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir. 1985)); accord Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo
Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1382 ( Fed. Cir. 2010) (imposing liability for
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underlying theory of imposing liability is that ―in substance if
not in form, the purchasing corporation is the same company as
the selling corporation.‖68
When determining if there has been a mere continuation of
the seller, the courts frequently focus on factors such as: (1) the
continued use of the seller‘s name, facilities, and employees, (2)
common identity of the stockholders69 or management of the
buyer and the seller,70 and (3) whether only one corporation is
in existence after the sale of assets.71 Courts are inconsistent in
their application of these factors72 to determine whether the
successor has a ―substantial similarity‖ to its predecessor.73
When only one corporation exists after the asset transfer, however, a court typically takes it as evidence that the successor is
substantially the same as its predecessor.74
patent infringement based on mere-continuation theory of successor as ―simply a ‗new hat‘‖).
68. McCarthy, 570 N.E.2d at 1012; accord Warne Invs., Ltd. v. Higgins,
195 P.3d 645, 650 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (imposing liability when there is a
change in form, but not in substance because ―if [a] corporation goes through a
mere change in form without a significant change in substance, it should not
be allowed to escape liability‖).
69. See Weaver v. Nash Int‘l, 730 F.2d 547, 548 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusing
to impose successor liability due to an absence of this factor).
70. See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55–58
(Alaska 2001); Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost Dev., Inc., 848 So. 2d 177, 180
( Miss. 2003); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27–28 (Nev. 1969); Dawejko v.
Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110–11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
71. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977).
72. See, e.g., Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 1:08-CV10 TS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *5 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2011) (quoting
Decius v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)
(recognizing only ―two requirements for proving that a corporation is a mere
continuation of a prior corporation: ‗(1) only one corporation remains after the
transfer of assets is complete, and (2) a common identity of stocks, stockholders, and directors between the two corporations.‘‖)), summary judgment
granted, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42408 (D. Utah Apr. 18, 2011).
73. A.R. Teeters & Assoc., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034,
1039– 40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); see also Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172,
1176 (Ill. 1997) (emphasizing that ―the test used in the majority of jurisdictions is whether there is a continuation of the corporate entity of the seller—
not whether there is a continuation of the seller’s business operation . . . .‖);
Balt. Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1294 ( Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1989); Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14, 17–18 (Wis. 1982).
74. Compare Tift, 322 N.W.2d at 17–18 (finding that the sale of the business resulted in liability for the purchasing company since it replaced the seller), with McCarthy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 ( Mass. 1991)
(stating necessary existence of only one corporation was not accomplished
since the seller continued to exist after the sale, so the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not impose liability under the mere-continuation exception).
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Historically, mere similarity would not be enough to impose liability on a successor corporation under the merecontinuation exception.75 That is, because of the close resemblance to the de facto-merger exception, mere continuation was
traditionally applied in limited circumstances where the successor was materially identical to the predecessor.76 Although it
played a somewhat diminished role in the historic application
of successor liability, the continuation concept has been a foundational concept for the evolution in the field of successor
liability.
B. EXPANSION OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
The traditional exceptions to the principle of successor nonliability developed as part of corporate law jurisprudence and
were primarily directed toward issues of liability for debts and
obligations that were contractual in nature.77 Judicial expansions of the last half century have drastically changed the scope

75. In Teeters, an Arizona appellate court declined to impose liability under the mere-continuation exception even though the successor corporation
was similar to its predecessor. 836 P.2d at 1039– 40. The successor corporation
was similar to the predecessor ―in that it had identical directors, officers, and
shareholders.‖ Id. at 1040. However, the court found it persuasive that the operations of the successor corporation were different than its predecessor since:
(1) it operated out of the owner‘s home rather than the predecessor‘s location;
(2) it offered only one product, rather than the full line of services offered by
the predecessor; and (3) there was a change of ownership between the two corporations. Id. Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a successor corporation that bought assets, hired several employees, and sold several product
lines from the predecessor corporation could not be held liable under the merecontinuation exception. Aluminum Line Prods. Co. v. Brad Smith Roofing Co.,
671 N.E.2d 1343, 1356 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (citing Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993)) (―Merely sharing the same
physical plant, employees and continuing to market some products of SMI by
ERA is not sufficient to establish liability under the mere-continuation
theory.‖).
76. See, e.g., Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 542 (D. Del.
1988) (―The test is not the continuation of the business operation, but rather
the continuation of the corporate entity.‖); Stratton v. Garvey Int‘l, Inc., 676
P.2d 1290, 1294 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no successor liability); Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337, 1341 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (requiring a finding of direct responsibility of at least some of the same shareholders to impose successor liability).
77. Pollak, supra note 40, at 143; Farris v. Glen Alden Corp. is considered
to be the seminal de facto merger case in the United States. 143 A.2d 25 (Pa.
1958). The court developed the theory as a way of providing dissenters‘ rights
for stockholders dissatisfied with corporate deals that were structured to avoid
statutory dissenters‘ rights.
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and applicability of the successor liability doctrine.78 This was
caused by the rise of products liability law and the concept of
strict liability in tort placing increased pressure on courts to
develop new avenues to give injured plaintiffs redress.79
Spurred by results deemed by many to be inequitable,
judges in the 1970s began to erode the perceived rigidity of the
traditional exceptions and fashion new remedies they believed
to be more just.80 Some jurisdictions found the restrictiveness
of the traditional successor nonliability rule especially objectionable when juxtaposed with the concept of strict products
liability that was then ―charming the nation‘s courts.‖81 Judicial expansion of the traditional exceptions has continued, and
new exceptions have been produced, each with ―sub-species‖82
and spinoffs of their own. The expansive evolution in the field
has been the cause for much confusion and consternation.83
Imagine, for example, a situation in which Hot Pants Corp.
produces and sells men‘s apparel. Hot Pants is known for manufacturing ―Sizzlers,‖ a line of baggy jeans that are popular in
the Northeast. Hot Pants agrees to sell its assets to Just-forHer, a nationwide women‘s retailer, which agrees to purchase
all of Hot Pants‘s assets, the rights to all products, and technology, for cash. In return, Hot Pants agrees to retain all liabilities
arising from products it manufactured prior to the transfer.
Hot Pants distributes the proceeds of the sale to its stockhold78. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462 (1985) (noting dramatic changes to products liability law
during this period); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791, 791–94 (1966) (characterizing the expansion of products liability as
―rapid‖ and ―explos[ive]‖); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of
Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1251–54 (1974) (discussing the development
and expansion of the products liability doctrine through case law).
79. Pollak, supra note 40, at 143 (describing this development as placing
―conceptual strain‖ on the courts).
80. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Christopher L. Frost, Successor Liability
for Defective Products: A Redesign Ongoing, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1173, 1174 –77
(2007) (explaining the common law evolution of expanded successor liability
theories).
81. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 845, 848.
82. Kuney, supra note 33, at 12.
83. Compare Green, supra note 6, at 20–21 (arguing that the judicial expansion of successor liability has made the doctrine impractical), with Kuney,
supra note 33, at 11–15 (arguing that the original intent of the doctrine was
malleable and efforts to preserve judicial discretion in the area are warranted).
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ers and then dissolves. After the sale, Just-for-Her continues to
manufacture Sizzlers jeans under the same name. The manufacturing continues to be done in the same facility, and Justfor-Her retains most of Hot Pants‘s employees and management. The Sizzlers manufactured after sale are identical in
every physical characteristic to those previously manufactured
by Hot Pants. A year later, Consumer Carl is injured by a pair
of Sizzlers when they burst into flames as a result of defective
fire-proofing during manufacturing. Carl‘s pants were manufactured by Hot Pants and sold prior to Just-for-Her purchasing
Hot Pants‘s assets.
Analyzing this hypothetical under the traditional exceptions, Consumer Carl would likely not be able to recover damages for his injuries even though Just-for-Her has continued to
sell the same product, manufactured in the same facility, by the
same people as the one that injured him. There is no fraud or
assumption of liabilities, and there is no continued ownership
of the surviving entity by the selling corporation‘s shareholders,
as traditionally may be required under a de facto-merger or
mere-continuation analysis. Faced with the limitations of the
traditional exceptions on one hand, and a solvent successor and
insolvent predecessor on the other, modern courts developed
what have been referred to as the ―liberal,‖84 or ―less restrictive,‖85 alternative theories of successor liability to increase redressability for injured consumers.86
1. The Continuity of Enterprise Exception
The first of the less restrictive avenues to successor liability to evolve was the continuity of enterprise exception.87 As its
name suggests, ―[i]t developed as an expansion of the traditional ‗mere continuation‘ exception.‖88 The two tests are very similar, with an important difference in focus: whereas the mere
continuation asks whether there is a continuation of the corpo84. Green, supra note 6, at 18.
85. Note, Successor Liability, Mass Tort, and Mandatory-Litigation Class
Action, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2357, 2360 (2005) (explaining the development of
the new successor liability exceptions).
86. See Michael B. Dorff, Selling the Same Asset Twice: Towards a New
Exception to Corporate Successor Liability Rules, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 717, 724 –
25 (2000) (explaining the causes and effects of the expansion in successor
liability).
87. See Pollak, supra note 40, at 143– 45 (examining the historical development of successor liability expansion).
88. Cupp, supra note 81.
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rate entity of the seller, the continuity of enterprise test sets a
lower standard and thus makes liability easier to achieve by focusing on whether there was a continuation of the seller’s business operations.89 The continuity of enterprise approach provides for the predecessor‘s liability to pass to the successor if
the court, based on the totality of the transaction, finds that the
successor is so similar to the predecessor that it is in effect continuing the predecessor‘s enterprise.90 As stated by one commentator, ―[t]he continuity of the enterprise doctrine is the
most advanced stage in the evolution of strict liability concepts
in product liability law.‖91
Articulated for the first time by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,92 the continuity of
enterprise exception marked an abrupt shift in the successor
liability framework ―by focusing on the continuity of the business without requiring continuity of the shareholders and
management.‖93 In Turner, the court sought to differentiate its
analysis from the corporate law origins of successor liability
and said that the traditional rule was ―not applicable to meeting the substantially different problems associated with products liability.‖94 The court explained that under the circumstances of the transfer at issue in the case, if the consideration
used had been stock rather than cash, the de facto-merger exception would apply.95 This distinction, the court concluded,
was insufficient to insulate the predecessor from liability.96
The court strained to characterize its holding as rooted in
tort rather than corporate law, but ultimately relied on traditional successor liability indicators to reach its holding.97 The
Turner court used four primary elements to reach its decision,
namely whether: (1) there was continuity of management, personnel, assets, facilities, and operations; (2) the predecessor
dissolves or ceases its ordinary course of business soon after the
sale; (3) the successor assumes the predecessor‘s liabilities to
the extent necessary to continue its business without interrup89. See id. at 848– 49.
90. See id.
91. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of the Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate Successorship in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT‘L L. 365, 376 (1996).
92. 244 N.W.2d 873, 881–82 ( Mich. 1976).
93. Blumberg, supra note 91, at 375.
94. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878.
95. Id. at 879–81.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 883–84 (describing factors).
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tion; and (4) the successor holds itself out as a continuation of
the predecessor to the public.98 Subsequent decisions analyzing
asset sales under the continuity of the enterprise approach
have reduced the factors necessary to demonstrate the exception to the first three cited by the court in Turner.99
Although the continuity of enterprise theory has not
achieved the wider acceptance of the product-line exception discussed below, several states have endorsed its application.100 In
2001, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court in Savage Arms,
Inc. v. Western Auto Supply Co., expressly adopted the continuity of enterprise approach when it held a successor corporation
liable for a defective rifle manufactured by the corporation from
which it bought assets.101 Conversely, a number of states have
expressly rejected the theory. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
for example, in Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., refused to adopt
the exception, basing its decision in large part on the successor‘s absence of responsibility for the defective product.102 Other jurisdictions have applied a similar logic in rejecting the exception.103 Generally, these courts have declined to expand
liability on the grounds that beyond the traditional exceptions,
successors should not be forced to bear liability for products
they did not create, place into the market, hold themselves out
as having produced, or directly profit from.104
2. The Product-Line Exception
Around the same time the Michigan Supreme Court decided Turner, the California Supreme Court was also struggling
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 510
( Mich. 1999) (applying a three-pronged Turner test).
100. See Cupp & Frost, supra note 80, at 1177 n.19 (identifying Alabama,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio and South Carolina as ―following
the continuity of enterprise approach‖).
101. 18 P.3d 49, 55–58 (Alaska 2001).
102. 438 N.W.2d 96, 99 ( Minn. 1989); accord Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe,
Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 408–09 (N.H. 1988) (explaining that, under New Hampshire law, a plaintiff must prove a manufacturer‘s responsibility in a strict liability claim).
103. In addition to Minnesota, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana,
Iowa, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin have all rejected the
continuity of enterprise exception. See Pollak, supra note 40, at 144 – 45 (cataloguing cases).
104. See, e.g., Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99 (explaining that any profit the
successor would receive from the predecessor‘s actions would be indirect).
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to break free from the traditional corporate law framework of
successor liability. In 1977, the California court did so by creating the ―product line exception‖ in Ray v. Alad.105 The successor
in Ray purchased the seller‘s physical plant, inventory, manufacturing equipment, trade name, and goodwill. The successor
continued to manufacture the predecessor‘s ladders under the
same product name and employed the predecessor‘s former employees to do so.106 Subsequent to the asset sale, the plaintiff
was injured by a defect caused by the predecessor‘s manufacturing.107
Like the Michigan court in Turner, the Ray decision portrayed the products liability area of successor liability as sui
generis.108 Giving ―special consideration‖109 to the underlying
policy concerns that face claimants injured by defective products after a corporation has dissolved, the court concluded that
―a party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of products under [circumstances like
those in Ray] . . . assumes strict tort liability for defects in units
of the same product line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was acquired.‖110
That is, ―[u]nlike the continuity of the enterprise doctrine, . . . the product line doctrine focuses on the continuity of
the products manufactured by the successor corporation with
those of the predecessor rather than on continuity of the operations of the business as a whole.‖111
The Ray court offered three justifications for imposing
strict liability in the case:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff ‘s remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor‘s acquisition of the business, (2) the successor‘s ability to assume the original manufacturer‘s
risk-spreading rule, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to
assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer‘s good will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business.112

The Ray court‘s hope was that the increased risk of liability
the product-line approach imposed on purchasers would pro105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

560 P.2d 3, 5 (Cal. 1977).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8–11.
Murphy, supra note 26, at 828 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ray, 560 P.2d at 11.
Blumberg, supra note 91, at 373.
Ray, 560 P.2d at 8–9.
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vide incentives for corporations to produce safer products and
protect ―otherwise defenseless victims‖ of defective products.113
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the purpose of the productline exception is purely compensatory in nature.114
Several jurisdictions adopted the product-line approach in
the wake of the Ray court‘s decision.115 Some courts, like the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, for example, believed that it was
best not to place language that was too restricting on its formulation of the product-line exception, ―so that in any particular
case the court may consider whether it is just to impose liability on the successor corporation.‖116 This open-ended reservation
of authority is not typical among jurisdictions adopting the
product-line exception, but it demonstrates the willingness of
some courts to impose liability based on equity balancing
principles.
***
So where does all of this lead? While arguably a laudable
example of judicial equity balancing, the patchwork system of
successor liability that has resulted is both illogical and inefficient. The simple fact is that there has not been a consensus on
any of the theories of successor liability, liberal or otherwise,
and the doctrinal diversity across the country presents a major
hazard for any prospective asset purchaser.117 Asset purchasers
are now forced to guess at judicial outcomes due to inconsistent
and conflicting rules, all while facing the potential imposition of
113. Id. at 10 (citing Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1970)).
114. Roe, supra note 4, at 1561 (―Although the cases considering successor
liability often refer to tort deterrence, the judicial inquiry may be a thinly
veiled effort to compensate the plaintiff as if the predecessor firm had not disappeared.‖).
115. See Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Gross-Given Mfg. Co., No. 08-3, 2009
WL 2959825, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2009); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc.,
431 A.2d. 811, 811 (N.J. 1981); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388
(Wash. 1984) (en banc); Cupp & Frost, supra note 80, at 1177 n.20 (identifying
California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and Washington as states that follow the product-line approach).
116. Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981).
117. Based on the ongoing development of the law, some courts struggle
when determining if the transaction at issue implicates successor liability concepts at all. See, e.g., Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 337 Fed. App‘x
480, 484 –87 (6th Cir. 2009); Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc. v. Regency Conversions, LLC, 636 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D. Mich. 2009); Gen. Elec. Capital
Corp. v. MHPG, Inc., No. 030833B, 2006 WL 2560314, at *5–6 ( Mass. July 27,
2006).
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crippling damage awards. The result is a system in which asset
sellers may collect windfalls at the expense of purchasers who
are left footing the bill for injury claims they had no part in
creating.
C. CONFLICTS OF LAW COMPLICATIONS
Corporate law issues are usually governed by the internal
affairs doctrine, ―a long-standing choice of law principle which
recognizes that only one state should have the authority to
regulate a corporation‘s internal affairs—the state of incorporation.‖118 This principle serves to protect corporations from conflicting demands, and to provide certainty and predictability.119
If the issue only affects a person as a ―member of the corporation (i.e., shareholder, director, president or officer),‖ it will
fall under the internal affairs doctrine.120 The internal affairs
doctrine allows corporations to create a structure that provides
predictability in choice of law, and permits them to choose the
118. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108,
1112 (Del. 2005); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 8
Cal. Rptr. 3d 56, 64 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
645 (1982)); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216 (Del. 1987). A comment in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 provides:
Application of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually
be supported by those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the
interstate and international systems, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the justified expectations of the parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (1971); see also
§ 303 cmt. d (stressing the importance of the uniform treatment of
shareholders).
119. 9 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4223.50 ( perm. ed., rev. vol. 2008). In CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, the United States Supreme Court stated that it is
―an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to create
corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares.‖ 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987). The Court also recognized that ―[a] State has an interest in promoting stable relationships
among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring
that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs.‖ Id.
120. 17 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8429 ( perm. ed., rev. vol. 2006). The internal affairs
governed by the doctrine can include incorporation, adoption of by-laws, issuance of shares, the holding of directors and shareholders‘ meetings, the declaration and payment of dividends and other distributions, charter amendments, mergers, consolidations, and reorganizations, the reclassification of
shares and the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding
shares of its own stock. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 302
cmt. a.
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state with laws most favorable in the areas considered important.121 Unfortunately for both the clarity of a potential claimant and the certainty of business parties to an asset-transfer
transaction, the internal affairs doctrine generally does not apply to successor liability claims:
The fact [that] the successor corporation was incorporated in Delaware does not control. While the law of the state of incorporation
may determine issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation,
different principles apply where the rights of third parties external to
the corporation are at issue.122

1. Successor Liability Choice of Law Doctrines
Choice of law doctrine interacts with successor liability issues when at least one party to a sale or injury is located in a
different state—for example, when a Minnesota corporation
purchases assets from a California corporation, and an Iowa
user is then injured by a product that the California corporation produced prior to the sale. The question of which state‘s
law will apply becomes an issue largely because of the variations in elements of the traditional successor liability exceptions and the unequal adoption of the expanded exceptions for
successor liability. If there were consistent laws regarding successor liability, it would not matter which state‘s law applied.
However, depending on which state‘s law is chosen, a company
incorporated in a state that has not adopted an expanded form
of the traditional exceptions or the new exceptions could be
subject to liability.
There are three basic approaches courts have taken to the
choice of law question: they have applied contract choice of law
principles,123 tort choice of law principles,124 or a mix of the
two.125 Contract choice of law doctrine generally allows for the
most predictable outcome from the corporation‘s perspective.126
121. VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113 (―By providing certainty and predictability, the internal affairs doctrine protects the justified expectations of the
parties with interests in the corporation.‖).
122. Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of S. Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1290 (Ind.
2009).
123. E.g., Binder v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768
(N.D. Ill. 2001).
124. E.g., Webb v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 75 F.2d 368, 374 (5th Cir.
1985).
125. E.g., White v. Cone-Blanchard Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770 (E.D.
Tex. 2002).
126. See Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co., 356 N.W.2d 380, 382 ( Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
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The corporation is actively involved in the contract that determines where they are liable, and is able to structure that contract to avoid liability in areas that it finds especially worrisome.127 Under contract choice of law principles, some courts
have looked to a choice of law clause in a purchase agreement
as a way of determining which state‘s law applies.128
The main issue with application of contract choice of law
doctrines is that the injured party in a successor liability suit is
not usually a party to the contract.129 Generally speaking, a
person cannot be held responsible for a contract to which they
were not a party.130 Following a contract choice of law doctrine
subjects the injured party to terms of a contract they did not
sign, and courts typically will not adopt such an approach.131
In contrast, the vast majority of courts have applied tort
choice of law principles in successor liability suits, looking to
the state with the most significant relationship to the inci127. See id. (discussing how the two parties to the contract expressly provided that Pennsylvania law should apply, and therefore, the choice of Pennsylvania law would be consistent with the expectations of the parties).
128. See John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., v. Acorn Window Sys., Inc., No.
C01-0151, 2003 WL 21397710, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 11, 2003); Binder, 184 F.
Supp. 2d at 768; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Tex.
App. 2000). There is also some authority for looking to the state of incorporation, Carriero v. Rhodes Gill & Co., No. CIV.A. 91-10515-RGS, 1995 WL
866092, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 1995) (applying Massachusetts choice of law
rules to apply Rhode Island law under the ―most significant relationship‖ test),
or looking to where the transfer of assets occurred, id. at *3. In 1997, a Kansas
court held that Colorado law applied in a medical malpractice recovery suit,
based on the Kansas rule that ―the liability of a dissolved predecessor corporation and its successor is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the predecessor was formed and where the transfer of its stock and assets took place.‖
St. Francis Reg‘l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Critical Care, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 1413,
1436–37 (D. Kan. 1997); accord In re Asbestos Litig. (Bell), 517 A.2d 697, 698
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (applying Delaware contract choice of law rules to apply
Pennsylvania law); Standal, 356 N.W.2d at 382 (applying Minnesota contract
choice of law rules to apply Pennsylvania law based on consistency and an interest in compensating the victims).
129. Litarowich v. Wiederkehr, 405 A.2d 874, 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979).
130. See Gold‘n Plump Poultry, Inc. v. Simmons Eng‘g Co., 805 F.2d 1312,
1318 (8th Cir. 1986) (―Under general contract (non-U.C.C.) law . . . [s]trangers
to a contract acquire no rights [or obligations] under the contract.‖).
131. See, e.g., Litarowich, 405 A.2d at 878 (―Predictability in corporate
transactions may be desirable. But, it does not weigh heavy against the need
for a meaningful remedy for an injured person . . . .‖); see also KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, § 15.04 (―The Buyer‘s counsel needs to be knowledgeable
with respect to the areas in which transferee or successor liability is imposed
since no expression of the parties to the contrary will eliminate this liability
from being assumed by the Buyer.‖).
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dent.132 Under this test, most courts have held that the state of
injury has the most significant relationship,133 but there are
courts that have held that the state of the asset transaction
controls134 or even that the state of incorporation does.135 While
the situs of the asset transaction and state of incorporation are
controlled by the corporation, the most significant relationship
test looks to the state of injury, over which the companies involved have little or no control.
Since a corporation has little control over the location of
the injury, which is often the place the court deems to have the
most significant relationship to the claim, this is the least predictable situation for corporations.136 Even if the law were settled that the place of the injury would govern, this is still a situation over which the purchasing corporation has no control.
However, looking to the place of injury does allow the injured
party to take advantage of any additional successor liability
doctrines their chosen state has adopted.
As a final bit of confusion, some courts have stated that
they will use contract choice of law principles in certain situations and tort choice of law principles in others.137 These courts
132. See, e.g., Webb v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 750 F.2d 368, 374 (5th Cir.
1985) (applying Texas choice of law rules to apply California law under ―most
significant relationship‖ test); Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F.
Supp. 1282, 1286 (D. Colo. 1984) (applying Colorado choice of law rules to apply Colorado law under the ―most significant contacts‖ test); Savage Arms, Inc.
v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 54 (Alaska 2001) (applying Alaska choice of
law rules to apply Alaska law under ―most significant relationship‖ test);
Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927, 936 ( Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (applying Missouri choice of law to apply Missouri law under ―most significant
relationship‖ test); Litarowich, 405 A.2d at 876–78 (applying New Jersey
choice of law to apply New Jersey law under ―most significant contacts‖ test);
Payne v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 190 P.3d 102, 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)
(applying Washington law based on the ―most significant relationship‖ test).
133. See, e.g., Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (D. Nev.
2001) (applying New York choice of law to apply New York law); Giraldi v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D. Md. 1988). In 1984, a district
court in Colorado looked to the state of the injury, following Colorado torts
choice of law rules, when a product manufactured by an Illinois corporation
who had sold their assets to another Illinois corporation injured a Colorado
resident in Colorado. Hickman, 592 F. Supp. at 1286.
134. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800 (W.D. Mich.
1974).
135. Carriero v. Rhodes Gill & Co., No. CIV.A. 91-105-RGS, 1995 WL
866092, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 1995).
136. Barron v. Kane & Roach, Inc., 398 N.E.2d 244, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(applying Illinois tort laws based on the state of the injury and domicile of the
injured party).
137. See, e.g., White v. Cone-Blanchard Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770
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have differed in their methodology; some use both contract and
tort choice of law within the same case,138 while others use contract choice of law to decide when there is a contractual choice
of law clause, but default to tort choice of law in its absence.139
As an example of the latter situation, in 2000, a Texas court
held that Delaware law would apply in a class action suit for
silica-related injuries, based on a valid choice of law provision,
but that if there wasn‘t one, the law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the law at issue would apply.140
2. Res Ipsa Loquitor: Amsted Industries
The lack of predictability in successor liability choice of law
is poignantly illustrated by a series of cases involving power
presses manufactured by the Johnson Machine and Press
Company. Johnson started manufacturing these power presses
sometime in 1948 or 1949.141 In 1956, Bontrager acquired the
assets and liabilities of Johnson Machine and Press Company,
and continued manufacturing presses under the Johnson name
until 1962.142 Bontrager retained a single share of Johnson
stock, although Johnson did not transact any business after its
acquisition.143 In 1962, Amsted Industries purchased all of
Bontrager‘s assets, including the share of Johnson stock and
continued to manufacture the Johnson presses until 1975,
when it sold that part of the business to LWE, Inc.144 Johnson
was dissolved in 1965.145 Bontrager continued to exist until
1964, though it did not transact any business after the sale of

(E.D. Tex. 2002).
138. Id. at 767.
139. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. v. Acorn Window Sys., Inc., No. C010151, 2003 WL 21397710, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 11, 2003) (applying Iowa
choice of law based on the ―most significant relationship‖ test, but would apply
contractual choice of law if there was one).
140. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Gordon, 16 S.W.3d 127, 133–34 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2000). In cases where a court uses both choice of law doctrines within the
same case the distinction may rest on the different types of claims made, as in
another Texas decision where the court looked at the ―most significant relationship‖ test for each count, holding that the contract had the most significant relationship to the issue of liability. White, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 770–71.
141. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 814 (N.J. 1981).
142. Ortiz v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 557–58 (Ct. App.
1975).
143. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 814.
144. Verhein v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 F.2d 1061, 1062 (7th Cir. 1979).
145. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 815.
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assets to Amsted.146
Since its sale of the press business to LWE, Amsted Industries has litigated the issue of successor liability thirteen times
based on claims by plaintiffs as to injuries caused by products
that Amsted did not manufacture or sell.147 It has litigated the
cases in California, Colorado, Illinois (twice), Michigan, New
Jersey, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio (twice) and
Wisconsin (twice). Amsted has won ten cases and lost three—
with the losses occurring once under Turner‘s continuity of enterprise exception,148 once under Ray‘s product-line exception,149 and once under the de facto-merger exception.150
These examples simply highlight the irrationality of the
current successor liability regime. Generally speaking, corporations are able to structure their transactions so as to limit, or at
least predict, the extent of their liability. However, in successor
liability cases there is a distinctly noncohesive body of law. Depending on the state in which a plaintiff sues, the corporation
could find its contractual choice of law claim honored, a more
corporation friendly set of laws applied than the one in their
state of incorporation, or a distinctly less friendly set of laws. In
any event, there is no way to know in advance which result will
occur.
III. POLICY ISSUES AND IMPERFECT PARTIAL
SOLUTIONS
In a very real sense the battle over successor liability is
over. That is, courts will impose successor liability when they
deem it equitable.151 The real problem is the uncertainty of its
146. Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d
1104, 1106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
147. Verhein, 598 F.2d at 1061; Diaz v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 97
(E.D.N.Y. 1989); Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich.
1979); Ortiz, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 556; Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d
1141 (Colo. App. 1992); Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 1104; Hernandez
v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Jones v. Johnson
Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe,
Inc., 543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988); McGaw v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 18
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Burr v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 105 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984); Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 811; Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d
820 (Wis. 1985).
148. Korzetz, 472 F. Supp. at 143– 44.
149. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 812, 818–20.
150. Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 102.
151. This may be a classic example of the situation where ―hard cases
make bad law.‖ N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes,
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application in any particular case, both for the putative plaintiff and the prospective defendant. This uncertainty creates
unnecessary transaction costs that benefit no one. Still, various
arguments have been proffered for the allowance and then the
expansion of successor liability.152 It is important to pause and
consider the validity of these arguments, particularly as they
might inform the best solution to the ―doctrinal morass and
high degree of uncertainty that now surround successor liability.‖153 Before addressing solutions, then, this Part will briefly
address three of the most common proffered rationales offered
in support of expansive successor liability: risk spreading, deterrence, and defendant‘s contribution to claimant‘s loss of
remedy.154
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXPANDED LIABILITY
A frequent justification courts use to support successor liability is that manufacturers possess superior ability to bear the
cost of injuries resulting from product defects.155 This argument
J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 1879–82 (noting
the debate between proponents of limited and unlimited liability).
153. Id. at 1885 n.15.
154. Not all rationales need be addressed. Some successor liability is necessary as based on fraud. To the extent that exceptions to the general limitation on liability are simply species of liability based upon fraud, it is argued,
extensions of liability are warranted so long as they are responses to transactional obfuscation. See, e.g., Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 748– 49 (2003) (introducing a fraud-based interpretation of the successor liability system). To the extent that successor
liability redresses fraud, no one disagrees with its application. However, modern applications of the theory are well beyond the boundaries of traditional
fraud.
Other proffered theories are untenable as mere conclusions. Some commentators have found that expansive successor liability is rooted in ―an inherently equitable notion that, in certain instances, the purchaser must take the
bad (the liabilities) with the good (the assets).‖ Kuney, supra note 33, at 12.
Some commentators have asserted that the liability arises out of an interest in
the property itself. This view posits that the liability is ―akin to an in rem interest that is said to ‗run with the land.‘‖ Kuney, supra note 33, at 12 (quoting
David Grey Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy in Some Unifying
Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants,
Product Liability, and Toxic Waste Clean Up, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119,
124 (1987)). This is less an argument than it is a conclusion. There is nothing
persuasive about the analogy by itself.
155. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir.
1974) (―The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic
judgment that the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from defective
products are better borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer.‖); Turn-
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fails for several reasons. While perhaps more able to financially
bear the cost than the injured consumer, successors are not the
source of the injury from which the costs flowed.156 The successor is not the producer of the injurious product, and although
simply affixing liability to any manufacturer might arguably
provide for cost bearing by the more ‗able‘ party, attaching liability solely based on the successor‘s ability to pay, or their
proximity to the true culprit, is illogical.157
Indeed, if placing liability on manufacturers generally is
the goal, there is a multitude of potentially superior alternatives that could provide greater protection for consumers and
more diffuse risk for producers. Creating a government-run,
public-funded trust, for example, would provide resources for
damage awards that could far exceed those of any successor.158
This type of social insurance would guarantee that the costs of
injuries are distributed evenly throughout society.159 Such a
system would allow for costs to be spread over time and not
limit them to defendants presently situated in the current tort
system.160 Thus, risk-spreading on a case-by-case basis is not a
persuasive rationale for successor liability.
A second argument for expansive successor liability is that
by requiring successors to absorb liability for their predeceser v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 ( Mich. 1976) (noting the ability of corporations to ―make suitable preparations‖ after becoming aware of the
possibility of successor products liability).
156. See Carol A. Rogala, Comment, Nontraditional Successor Product Liability: Should Society Be Forced to Pay the Cost?, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 37, 52–53
(1990) (―The predominant arguments against expanding successor liability
rest on the separate and distinct identities of the successor corporation and
the predecessor corporation, who manufactured the product and placed it in
the stream of commerce.‖).
157. See id.
158. See Green, supra note 6, at 31 (―A universal, publicly funded compensation system would far better achieve maximum spreading.‖); see also Murphy, supra note 26, at 836 (―Although the cases infer that the successor corporation is in a good position to absorb the cost, in reality the imposition of
successor liability could severely cripple industries which are comprised mostly of small corporations.‖).
159. Murphy, supra note 26, at 837.
160. Id. (―If cost-spreading is maximized through a form of social or industry-wide insurance, manufacturers have no direct financial deterrent to the
production of defective products since the manufacturer‘s payments for such
insurance are independent of any accidents caused by their products.‖); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 94 (1970) (noting the tension
―between achieving the desired degree of primary accident cost reduction
through general deterrence and minimizing the secondary costs of accidents
through perfect loss spreading‖).
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sor‘s defective products, asset sellers will be incentivized to
produce better products.161 There is no question that tort law
serves an important deterrent function in society by making
harmful ―activities more expensive, and thereby less attractive
to the extent of the accident costs they cause.‖162 In general
terms, the deterrence rationale is well supported in the products liability and manufacturing contexts, but it wanes when
applied to successor corporations.163
The deterrence rationale is premised on the idea that because injuries stemming from defective products represent
costs to successors, asset prices will be forced down as the risk
of latent defects grows.164 It is argued that when producers are
forced to bear the cost of the injuries their products cause, or to
devalue their assets in a sale because of the risk of future
claims, manufacturers will produce safer products to maximize
value.165 Ultimately, it is thought, producers will manufacture
safer products so long as the cost to do so does not exceed the
costs of the injuries their products cause.166
While perfectly supportable for application to predecessormanufacturers, the deterrence rationale is less convincing
when applied to successors.167 First, because injury prevention
procedures are implemented only so long as their costs remain
below the cost of liability, it is axiomatic that, to maximize
safety measures, responsibility for these procedures should be
borne by ―the one who can ‗avoid the accident costs most cheaply through some safety measures or otherwise.‘‖168 The successor has had no part in creating the injurious product and has
161. Murphy, supra note 26, at 838.
162. Id. (quoting CALABRESI, supra note 160, at 26).
163. Id. (noting that ―deterrence rationale is a sufficient justification for
imposing liability in our tort system even though it is shown that this rationale does not support all of the successor liability theories‖).
164. Cf. id. at 838 n.157 (―Requiring the successor to be liable for defective
products of its predecessor also serves as a deterrent against the manufacture
of defective products . . . [T]he predecessor will probably receive a lower consideration in the sale of its assets if its successor is going to be liable for the
predecessor‘s defective products. Therefore, in order to increase the value of its
assets, the predecessor has the incentive not to produce defective products.‖).
165. See id. (―If manufacturers know they will be liable for the costs of accidents their products cause, the deterrence theory encourages manufacturers
to make safer products in order to avoid the extra costs of accidents.‖).
166. Id.
167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
168. Murphy, supra note 26, at 838 (quoting CALABRESI, supra note 160, at
135).
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no ability to limit future injuries resulting from prior defects.169
By using the successor as a conduit in an attempt to pass the
cost of injuries through to the predecessor, current successor
liability law fails to force the full cost of claimants‘ injuries to
be borne by defective manufacturers.170
Moreover, there is no reason to think that the risk premium that buyers would demand would be any greater than
the liability cost that the defective products represented to the
seller before the asset sale, and there is certainly no reason to
think that the seller would be willing to discount its assets below that level. The cost of the spread between the purchaser‘s
risk premium and the seller‘s true liability cost would be absorbed by the successor when, in fact, it is the predecessor that
is in a superior position to deter the creation of the cost.171
Thus, there is no reason to think that potential successor liability would impose any greater incentive on manufacturers to
produce safe products than would normally exist. The deterrence rationale is essentially double-deterring the predecessor,
or as economists describe, it is creating a ―safety overincentive.‖172
A third argument for imposing liability on successors in asset sales is that but for the purchaser bringing about the extinction of the primary tortfeasor, the plaintiff would be able to
recover.173 This argument has the benefit of addressing the real
issue in asset transfers: the dissolution of the predecessor.174 As
a preliminary matter, it must be noted that, despite many
courts using language suggesting the contrary, an asset purchase does not destroy a plaintiff‘s remedies against a prede169. See Green, supra note 6, at 35 (―[ I ]mposing liability on an entity that
by definition did not contribute to a product‘s design or manufacture quite obviously cannot further this deterrence function.‖).
170. See id. at 36 (noting that products liability law, in order to properly
allocate costs, must operate such that ―the entity that had the opportunity to
take safety measures—the predecessor—should bear the costs of productrelated injuries‖).
171. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
172. Green, supra note 6, at 36. In this scenario, a purchaser would bear
not only the cost of liability associated with its own products, but also those of
its predecessor. The only remedial safety measure available to the successor is
removing the predecessor‘s product line from its business, because, quite obviously, whatever defective product may be the source of the future liability
has already been produced. See id. at 47– 49 (discussing piecemeal acquisition
strategy and the advantage of dissolution-restricting statutes).
173. Id. at 32.
174. Id.
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cessor.175 Rather, it is the predecessor‘s dissolution that ends a
long-tail plaintiff‘s recourse against the predecessor.176 While
the asset purchaser may facilitate the predecessor‘s dissolution
by providing it with increased liquidity and assets that are
more readily transferrable to stockholders, the fact of the sale
alone does not force the predecessor to cease its business operations.
B. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR THE CURRENT CHAOS
Successor liability, at bottom, is a judicial construction that
has developed in response to perceived inadequacies of the corporate form and limited liability generally.177 The central
weakness in the system is that the beneficiaries of the true offender, the stockholders of the predecessor-manufacturer, are
insulated by the limited liability provided by the corporate
form.178 That long-tail plaintiffs cannot recover from the stockholders of a dissolved manufacturer, however, is in conflict with
the limited liability afforded corporate stockholders, not with the
acquisition of assets by the acquiring (successor) corporation.
Using the hypothetical above, imagine that Hot Pants were
owned by three parties, each with an equal number of shares in
the company. This time, however, they decide not to sell their
assets, but merely to dissolve and distribute the assets of the
business equally among themselves. Consumer Carl suffers the
same injuries as he did before, but, alas, there is no one to
sue.179 Absent a successor in interest, there is no money to fund
Carl‘s damage award.
175. Id. at 32–33; see also Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1977) (citing the destruction of a product liability plaintiff ‘s remedy as a justification for
expanded liability for the successor).
176. Green, supra note 6, at 33 (identifying dissolution and liquidation statutes as the ―forces‖ that lead to a plaintiff ‘s inability to recover from a predecessor).
177. See Cupp, supra note 81 (―In response [to tension between expansive
and restrictive liability], a significant minority of courts tinkered with the traditional corporate law rule by adopting one of two less restrictive approaches
to successor liability.‖); Green, supra note 6, at 19 (noting that many courts
and commentators view successor liability as representative of an inherent
tension between policies underlying products liability and traditional corporate law).
178. Cf. Green, supra note 6, at 59 (―The law should not allow corporations
to cease operations in a manner that frustrates claims of legitimate creditors.
Most corporate creditors are protected either by statutes or contractual provisions bargained for during the existence of the corporate debtor.‖).
179. This example assumes that the corporation was not dissolved in an
attempt to avoid liability.
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This example demonstrates well that the true theoretical
issue of successor liability lies not in whether or not a successor
should be liable for the torts of a predecessor, but in answering
the normative question of how much protection from liability
stockholders should be afforded in the event of dissolution. If
the aim of successor liability law is to use the successor as a
conduit to transfer injuries from plaintiffs to predecessors, it
would be theoretically more effective to create legislative rules
permitting plaintiffs to seek damages from the predecessor‘s
stockholders directly. To be sure, corporate law statutes that
permit distributions of the proceeds of asset sales without either providing for funds to be set aside to compensate future
claimants, or for clawback provisions, play a far more significant role than asset-purchasing successors in inhibiting redress
for plaintiffs.
So what is to be done? Some commentators, seeing what
they perceive to be a runaway horse imposing random liability
under the modern successor liability doctrines, wistfully have
called for a return to the original, narrow exceptions to successor liability.180 Indeed, this is the position taken in the Third
Restatement of Torts.181 The provision on successor liability only allows avoidance of the presumption of nonliability when one
of the four traditional exceptions is satisfied. As for expansive
theories of liability, the comments to the Restatement counsel
against going there:
As courts have recognized, it would be difficult, and often impossible,
to implement and administer a liability rule that attempted to limit
post-transfer plaintiffs‘ rights to an aggregate amount equal to the
net value of the predecessor before transfer. Tort judgments are imposed independently of one another, in various jurisdictions; no central authority exists to assure that, in the aggregate, tort judgments
do not exceed a predetermined total amount. Thus, the expanded successor liability rules in a minority of states, not limited to time-oftransfer net value, replace one risk of injustice—that the assets transfer may unfairly reduce plaintiffs‘ recoveries in cases that do not satisfy the traditional exceptions (reflected in Subsections (a) through
(d))—with another, possibly greater, injustice: that the transfer may
give tort plaintiffs a windfall at the expense of companies who engage
in asset transfers and, in turn, at the expense of the consuming
public.182

180. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: Individual
and Corporate Issues, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1167–70 (2002); Rogala, supra note
156, at 38, 51–54, 71–72.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (1998).
182. Id. cmt. b, at 210–11.
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The problem with this view is that it is both too late and
too little. It is too late because jurisdictions representing a substantial portion of the populace of the United States have already adopted some form of the expanded successor liability
theories.183 It is also too little because, as we have seen, even
the traditional exceptions have been expanded. Moreover, given
the conflicts of law issues, the variation between and among
the states as to application of even the traditional exceptions
makes predicting the imposition of successor liability nearly
impossible. Going back is not an option and, even if it was, the
uncertainty there makes it a less than desirable place to be.
Another approach has been taken by the drafters of the
American Bar Association‘s Model Business Corporation Act,
who have been wrestling with the issue of successor liability
since 1950. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA) currently serves as the foundation and framework for
the corporate laws of thirty-one states.184 When the RMBCA
was adopted in 1984, it recognized the need to expand the remedies available to post-dissolution claims:
Earlier versions of the Model Act did not recognize the serious
problem created by possible claims that might arise long after the dissolution process was completed and the corporate assets distributed
to shareholders. . . . The problems raised by these claims are intractable. . . . In some circumstances successor liability theories have been
applied to allow plaintiffs incurring post-dissolution injuries to bring
suit against the person that acquired the corporate assets. Some
courts have refused to broaden these doctrines, particularly when the
purchaser of the corporate assets has not continued the business of
the dissolved corporation. In these cases, the remedy of the plaintiff is
limited to claims against the dissolved corporation and its shareholders receiving assets pursuant to the dissolution.185

The remedy adopted was to expand from two years to five
years the time period in which claims could be asserted against
the shareholders of a dissolved corporation for recovery of the
amounts distributed.186 However, this lengthy time period, during which distributed assets are at risk of being recalled,
proved unsatisfactory. In 2000, the RMBCA was once again
183. See Cupp & Frost, supra note 80, at 1178 (confirming earlier conclusions and clarifying that at least ―forty-three percent of the population resided
in the thirteen states that had adopted one of the less restrictive approaches. . . . [T]he less restrictive approaches were likely being applied in more lawsuits than was the traditional approach‖).
184. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, intro. note at ix (2011).
185. Id. § 14.07 official cmt., at 14 -65 to -66.
186. Id. cmt. hist. background, at 14 -68.
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amended to change the period of shareholder liability to three
years after dissolution, which is where it stands now.187
The result of this vacillation was predictable. Fourteen jurisdictions have the current three-year limitations period, fourteen have the original two-year period, thirteen have the interim five-year period, and two jurisdictions have a four-year
period; the remainder have no explicit limitations period, and
―instead, the underlying cause of action dictates the corresponding statute of limitations . . . .‖188 More fundamentally, the
RMBCA solution does not address the problem of successor liability directly. That is, whatever time period is used for claims
against a dissolving corporation or its shareholders, the
RMBCA does not say that suit within the specified period is the
exclusive remedy of injured claimants. Rather, at the end of
whatever period is specified, claimants will still try to impose
liability on the successor corporation since the remedy against
the selling corporation and its shareholders is no longer available. The courts will then once again face the same question of
whether to impose successor liability.189
There are other variations on the same theme of holding
187. For the text of the relevant amendment, see Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Dissolution, 55 BUS.
LAW. 1227, 1227 (2000). The proposed amendments were adopted on September 24, 2000. Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business
Corporation Act Pertaining to Dissolution—Final Adoption, 56 BUS. LAW. 83,
83 (2000).
188. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.07 cmt. statutory comparison, at 14 -70
(2011).
189. A related approach is a dissolution-restricting statute, at least one
geared toward product liability claimants. See Green, supra note 6 and accompanying text. This approach would preclude dissolution or distribution of assets to shareholders until it has made ―adequate provision[s] for postdissolution products liability claims.‖ Id. at 50–51. Such provisions may take one of
three forms: (1) purchase of products liability insurance; (2) transfer of ―liability for future products liability claims to the purchaser of the corporation‘s assets‖; or (3) use of any other method that protects those asserting postdissolution products liability claims.‖ Id. at 51. The positive aspect of this proposal is
that at least it expressly states that successors are not liable for their predecessor products unless they explicitly agreed to such liability. Id. at 54 –55.
However, as with the RMBCA approach, preventing dissolution is not an acceptable solution because it prohibits the valid distribution of corporate assets
to shareholders. Obviously missing is a reference to a statute of limitations.
Moreover, the proposed conditions to dissolution, such as insurance, are impractical. For a discussion of both the RMBCA approach and the Green approach, see David B. Hunt, Case Note, Tort Law—Towards a Legislative Solution to the Successor Products Liability Dilemma—Niccum v. Hydra Tool
Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 ( Minn. 1989), 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 581, 597–602
(1990).
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the selling corporation and its shareholders liable.190 For example, one proposal would employ a two-step process for imposing liability on successors.191 If ―the predecessor does not remain intact or the parties fail to arrange for insurance
sufficient to satisfy claims in an amount equal to the full value
of the assets [step 1] . . . [then] the successor would be ‗tagged‘
with liability [step 2].‖192 This solution was posed in light of the
failures of others to satisfy policy goals of both products liability and corporate law principles.193 However, the author also
readily admits that ―[o]ne cannot count on the availability of
fairly-priced insurance, and it is thus inadequate as an exclusive alternative to successor liability.‖194 If that is true, then it
seems reasonable to skip the first step, including its significant
transaction costs, and move directly to tag the purchaser with
unlimited successor liability.
IV. A SIMPLE STATUTORY SOLUTION TO SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY
The Supreme Court in 1890, referring to the concept of
successor liability, stated simply that ―[s]uch a doctrine has no
existence.‖195 The twelve decades that have passed since have
seen the growth of business, of technology, and of the wide190. One particularly extreme proposal is to hold the seller corporation‘s
shareholders to unlimited liability for the liabilities of the seller. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7. Although theoretically interesting, such a
wholesale rejection of the concept of limited liability will never happen. For
other suggested proposals, Sharon L. Cloud provides a listing of proposed solutions, with little discussion, including: (1) contracting for protection from unknown future claims; (2) assignment of the seller‘s rights under the policy or
be named an additional insured; (3) having the seller establish an escrow account against future claims; (4) getting a shareholder agreement to indemnify
a buyer for subsequent claims; (5) bona fide purchaser exception; (6) rebuttable presumption of absolute liability; (7) combination of trust fund doctrine
and deferred abatement statutes; (8) expansion of bankruptcy law; (9) RMBCA
approach. Cloud, supra note 26, at 816–17.
191. See Roe, supra note 4, at 1597–98.
192. Id. at 1598.
193. Id. at 1563 (concluding that ―each alternative fails to satisfy one or
more aspects of our two policy goals‖ of compensation and predictability).
194. Id. at 1592.
195. Fogg v. Blair, 133 U.S. 534, 541 (1890) (―That [trust fund] doctrine only means that the property must first be appropriated to the payment of the
debts of the company before any portion of it can be distributed to the stockholders. It does not mean that the property is so affected by the indebtedness
of the company that it cannot be sold, transferred, or mortgaged to bona fide
purchasers for a valuable consideration, except subject to the liability of being
appropriated to pay that indebtedness. Such a doctrine has no existence.‖).
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spread harm that defective products or operations can bring to
a great multitude of people. Sometimes these defects and the
resulting harms do not readily appear until decades after the
product‘s widespread use. The development of successor liability doctrine has indicated a desire of the courts to find ways to
compensate injured parties in these modern circumstances.
This predilection has resulted in expansion of the traditional
exceptions to successor nonliability, as well as the creation of
new exceptions. In specific, discrete areas of statutory regulation, such as environmental cleanup liability, the rule of nonliability has been discarded completely. Indeed, today it may be
safer and more realistic for companies purchasing business assets to presume successor liability than to assume the contrary.196
Returning to the main goals to be accomplished in this
arena can serve to signal the best resolution for the current
patchwork of doctrines and the resulting randomness of the
imposition of liability. One primary goal is remedial—
compensation for injured parties. The other primary goal is
predictability—business parties need to know when liability
will be imposed so that they can negotiate for an efficient transfer of resources without fear that the transaction will be judicially restructured by an ad hoc imposition of successor liability. The optimal answer must provide compensation to victims
and clarity to the business parties.
The answer proposed here is an automatic transfer of selling company liability to the purchasing company in a sale of
substantially all of the assets of the seller. That is, as is the result of a merger under existing corporate law,197 a sale of substantially all of the assets of a corporate entity should impose
liability on the purchasing entity for the full extent of the seller‘s liabilities.
196. 1 SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND TENDER
OFFERS § 2:9.2(G)(1), at 2-70 (Practising Law Inst. 2011) (―As an economic
matter, the fundamental difference between a stock purchase agreement and
an asset acquisition agreement is that in the asset acquisition, certain liabilities can be left behind with the target. However, if the acquirer is forced to assume certain undesired liabilities of the target under a successor liability
principle, then the transaction would be, to that extent, converted economically into a stock acquisition and the benefit of the asset acquisition is lost.‖).
197. For a discussion on the effects of a merger on the liability of the constituent companies, see supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. Although
this proposal would impose liability on the purchasing entity in the same
manner as a statutory merger, there are still reasons to prefer the asset purchase transaction structure to a merger. See supra note 20.

416

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:371

This result accomplishes both of the primary goals in the
successor liability dilemma. As to the compensation goal, if the
financial value of the purchasing company is available to satisfy both known and unknown claims of the selling entity, compensation for claimants of the seller will be maximized. In addition, since this liability will be automatic and without
exception, claimants avoid the existing wasteful necessity to litigate over the possible application of one of the various exceptions to non-successor liability.
As to clarity and predictability for the business parties, if
asset purchasing companies know in advance that they will be
liable for the obligations of the selling company, negotiations
for the value of the assets of the selling company could focus on
these actual and potential liabilities. Purchasers would have an
incentive to scour the operations and obligations of the seller to
determine, to the extent possible, the type and extent of the
liabilities to be assumed. The asset-transfer transaction could
then be rationally priced by negotiation between the seller and
buyer.
In return for the potentially greater liability assumed by
the purchasing company, this company has the certainty of
knowing the extent of its potential liabilities. In addition, by
limiting the transfer of liabilities to situations where there has
been a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the seller,
the purchasing company avoids potential liability under piecemeal theories of successor liability, such as the product-line exception, at least to the extent that this theory has been applied
where there is a transfer of less than substantially all of the
selling company‘s assets.
In order to concretely test this proposal, it is necessary to
craft a model successor liability statute. Let‘s start with the
underlying transaction, a sale of assets. Under existing corporate law in all states, a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of any company is a fundamental corporate event. It is a
regulated corporate transaction that gives rise to certain procedural requirements and approval mechanisms. A sale of all assets of a company requires an affirmative vote of the board of
directors, an affirmative vote of the shareholders of the company, and often gives rise to dissent and appraisal rights on behalf of dissenting shareholders.198 The requirement of share198. Although not important to the current analysis, not all states grant
dissent and appraisal rights in connection with a sale of substantially all the
assets of a corporation. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (2011)
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holder approval identifies this transaction as an important one
in the life of a company. In the terms of the RMBCA:
§ 12.02. Shareholder Approval of Certain Dispositions
(a) A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of assets, other than a
disposition described in section 12.01 [a pledge or sale in the ordinary
course of business or distribution to shareholders], requires approval
of the corporation‘s shareholders if the disposition would leave the
corporation without a significant continuing business activity. If a
corporation retains a business activity that represented at least 25
percent of total assets at the end of the most recently completed fiscal
year, and 25 percent of either income from continuing operations before taxes or revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal year,
in each case of the corporation and its subsidiaries on a consolidated
basis, the corporation will conclusively be deemed to have retained a
significant continuing business activity.199

One of the substantial benefits of the RMBCA formulation
is its determination to set a specific numerical guideline for
when an asset seller is not disposing of all or substantially all
of its assets.200 If twenty-five percent in value is retained by the
transferring entity, the procedural requirements and shareholder approval are not necessary.
In order to make the proposed successor liability statute effective to transfer liabilities to the purchaser, an additional
provision mirroring the result in a merger is needed. Under the
existing law of all states, the effect of a merger is to combine all
of the assets and the liabilities in acquiring entity. In the terms
of the RMBCA:
§ 11.07. Effect of Merger or Share Exchange
(a) When a merger becomes effective:
(1) the corporation or eligible entity that is designated in the plan
of merger as the survivor continues or comes into existence, as
the case may be; . . .
(3) all property owned by, and every contract right possessed by,
each corporation or eligible entity that merges into the survi( providing for dissent and appraisal rights in an asset transfer), with DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2010) ( providing for these rights only in a merger).
199. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a).
200. Some state corporate laws leave the issue of what is ―all or substantially all‖ of a corporation‘s assets undefined, resulting in unfortunate and
sometimes indeterminate litigation. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 271. For a discussion of
the problems this vague phrase can cause, see Garon, Stanchfield & Matheson, supra note 55, at 833–38.
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vor is vested in the survivor without reversion or impairment;
(4) all liabilities of each corporation or eligible entity that is
merged into the survivor are vested in the survivor;201

Combining these provisions together and modifying the
language to govern asset transfers, the model successor liability statute looks like this:
Model Successor Liability Statute
Shareholder Approval of Certain Dispositions; Successor Liability.
(a) A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of assets, other than a
disposition described in section 12.01 [a pledge or sale in the ordinary
course of business or distribution to shareholders], requires approval
of the corporation‘s shareholders if the disposition would leave the
corporation without a significant continuing business activity. If a
corporation retains a business activity that represented at least 25
percent of total assets at the end of the most recently completed fiscal
year, and 25 percent of either income from continuing operations before taxes or revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal year,
in each case of the corporation and its subsidiaries on a consolidated
basis, the corporation will conclusively be deemed to have retained a
significant continuing business activity.
( b) When a disposition of assets becomes effective, all liabilities of
the corporation making the disposition of assets are vested in the acquiring corporation without reversion or impairment.

This is a good start but it is not optimal. While this statute
would be appropriate if proposed as a model or uniform statute
for adoption by individual states, that would leave to the states
the choice whether such adoption is appropriate. In this context, where a major part of the problem is variation in successor liability doctrine and application among the states, leaving
the adoption to state choice is ill-advised. Over a century of experience has shown that this is an area of the law where diversity is not a positive factor and allowing the states to be laboratories for the ongoing evolution of legal doctrine would be a
mistake. Rather, a federal statute is necessary to provide uniformity to this area of the law. In addition, since each state
has its own corporate procedural and voting requirements in
connection with a disposition of assets, the federal statute need
not address those aspects of the transaction and can focus solely on successor liability.
201. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.07(a).
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In addition, to be completely effective, the federal successor
liability statute must preempt state successor liability law in
all its permutations.202 That is, as the tradeoff for assuming the
liabilities of the transferor company, the acquiring company
should know that it will not have to litigate over other successor liability claims.203 Primary among these preempted claims
might be those currently pursued under the product-line or
continuity of enterprise exceptions. As modified, the model federal successor liability statute would look like this:
Federal Successor Liability Statute
Effect of Disposition of Assets; Successor Liability.
(a) A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of assets, other than a
pledge or sale in the ordinary course of business or distribution to
shareholders, is governed by the provisions of subsection ( b), if the
disposition would leave the transferring corporation without a significant continuing business activity. If a corporation retains a business
activity that represented at least 25 percent of total assets at the end
of the most recently completed fiscal year, and 25 percent of either income from continuing operations before taxes or revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal year, in each case of the corporation
and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, the corporation will conclusively be deemed to have retained a significant continuing business activity.
( b) When a disposition of assets described in the first sentence of subsection (a) becomes effective, all liabilities of the corporation making
the disposition are vested in the acquiring corporation.
(c) Except as provided in subsection ( b) and except for any additional
liability expressly assumed by the acquiring corporation in the acquisition agreement, no disposition of assets will impose any liability on
the acquiring corporation for the liabilities of the transferor.
(d) All federal and state common law theories of successor liability,
including de facto merger, mere continuation, continuity of enter202. The federal statute also would preempt the federal common law successor liability theories that have evolved in enforcement of several federal
statutes where successor liability is not explicitly addressed.
203. Following the guideline of the RMBCA, these preempted claims would
include those where the selling corporation ―retains a business activity that
represented at least 25 percent of total assets at the end of the most recently
completed fiscal year, and 25 percent of either income from continuing operations before taxes or revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal year.‖
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a). Therefore, acquisition of less than 75 percent of a selling corporation‘s assets would impose no successor liability.
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prise, product-line theory, or otherwise, are preempted in full and do
not exist as a basis of liability under federal or state law.

This proposed federal successor liability statute balances
the need for compensation with the need for certainty by bringing clarity to the successor liability arena. Subsection (b) provides that, when a company acquires all or substantially all of
the assets of another company, putative plaintiffs are given a
clear statutory basis to seek redress for their injuries against
the purchasing company. There is no more need for inefficient
litigation over whether liability will attach, irrespective of
whether the claims sound in contract or tort.204 Claimants are
free to assert their claims against the full range of assets
owned by the acquiring company.
Acquiring companies, on the other hand, would now assume liabilities identical to those that they would acquire if the
transaction had been structured as a statutory merger.205 For
this potential increase in liability, they receive certain significant benefits. First and foremost, acquisition transactions for
all of a company‘s assets can be negotiated with the knowledge
that liabilities will follow assets. The uncertainty of which liabilities will stay and which will attach to the acquirer is gone,
204. In addition to the benefits of reduced costs for asset purchasers, the
savings in litigation costs that would be achieved under the proposed model
would be significant. The current ―[ l]iberal successor liability law‖ system
―virtually mandates that the plaintiff use substantial resources to identify the
appropriate defendant.‖ Green, supra note 6.
205. The most significant problem with the proposed statute is the same
problem that faces all acquiring companies in a merger situation, that is,
whether or not they can accurately predict potential liability costs. The result
of a negative answer may be that the acquisition simply does not take place.
The high cost of accurate risk assessment would be out of reach for many
small manufacturing corporations, which, relying on expert testimony, the
Florida Supreme Court found to ―comprise ninety percent of the nation‘s manufacturing enterprises.‖ Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1050 ( Fla.
1982).
If small manufacturing corporations liquidate rather than transfer
ownership, the chances that the corporations will be replaced by other
successful small corporations are decreased. As a result, there will be
fewer small manufacturers and the larger more centralized manufacturers will increase their production to meet the demands of the marketplace.
Id. As a result, imposing liability on purchasers of productive assets impedes
the free alienability of corporate assets, thereby discouraging stockholder investment of capital. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 cmt. b (1998).
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as is the useless litigation to determine that issue. Second, subsection (c) provides that the only liability imposed on the acquirer is that which is expressly provided in subsection (b) or
accepted as part of the acquisition documents. All federal or
state common law successor liability claims are explicitly
preempted under subsection (d). Quite simply, the acquiring
corporation is told: If you acquire substantially all of the assets
of another company, you also absorb all of its liabilities; if you
acquire only a portion of the assets of another company, your
liability with respect to those assets is limited to any that you
assume as part of the acquisition transaction.
CONCLUSION
It is common ground that the existing menagerie of successor liability law is unacceptable. Courts apply ever-shifting
rules of law without consistent reasoning. As a result, those
companies engaging in corporate transactions are left in the
precarious and inefficient position of forecasting the result of
corporate acquisitions with little guidance. It is worth considering, therefore, the seemingly unnecessary time, money, and
commitment that are spent on litigation between two parties,
claimant and successor, that have nothing to do with one
another besides their common association with the now-defunct
manufacturer of a defective product. If legislation is adopted
creating a system that is consistent with the principles of this
Article, that is, compensation and clarity, both parties would be
better off. To be sure, the stockholders of dissolved corporations
would be worse off because they often would receive fewer
proceeds in the event of an asset sale, but it is with them that
the cost of defective products and other preexisting liabilities
should lie.
The proposed successor liability legislation provides equi
table risk-spreading among differently situated market participants and society at large. While judicial attempts to balance
the competing interests of an asset sale may be commendable,
implementing a clear liability standard serves to alleviate the
inequity produced by the chaotic developments of the common
law system. The proposed statute succeeds in this effort by providing a clear remedy to injured claimants. It also means that
the transferring company may be held financially responsible
for the damage it caused as part of the negotiations surrounding the asset sale process, while simultaneously providing purchasers with increased predictability and certainty as to their
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